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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Guatemala is a country with a history of justice problems: human
rights, corruption, impunity, and inefficiency. Women, the poor, and
the indigenous are especially disenfranchised by the foregoing problems. After a genocidal civil conflict, the need is clear for establishing the rule of law.
To address these concerns, the U.S. Agency for International Development ("USAID") has assisted Guatemala with the development
of a new operational model-the Justice Center. This structure brings
together police, prosecutors, judges, public defenders, local civil society, and private law practitioners to solve problems in a collaborative framework. The core ingredient of the Justice Centers is the
people coming together in a voluntary effort to break with traditional
structures. In a nutshell, the Centers are designed to make the justice
system actually work in a given location.
Key elements of the Justice Centers are: (1) organizational and
administrative structures that reduce delay, minimize exposure to
corruption, and create accountability; (2) improved functioning of
key actors in their assigned roles and management structures and
techniques that promote team approaches; (3) use of standardized,
user-friendly forms; (4) user-friendly case management and records
systems that reduce opportunities for corruption, improve the quality
of case supervision, and generate accurate statistics; (5) interpreters
and culturally-appropriate outreach and education programs in local
languages to make the system truly accessible to non-native Spanish
speakers; and (6) promotion of alternative dispute resolution, plea
bargaining ("criterio de oportunidad"), stay of prosecution ("suspensi6n condicional"), and other mechanisms to settle cases identified through improved case intake and diversion programs.
Results so far are impressive. The Justice Centers show improved
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customer service, access to justice and quality of service, all with enhanced transparency. This, in turn, has advanced procedural due process and human rights. Today, Justice Centers in various stages of
development are found in Zacapa, Escuintla, Quetzaltenango, San
Benito (Pet~n), Santa Eulalia (Huehuetenango), Nebaj (El Quich6),
and Santa Cruz.
After such a prolonged period in Guatemalan history of disrespect
for the law, change does not come overnight. Guatemala will have to
stay the course for several generations before true access to a rule of
law is extended to all citizens. The Justice Center strategy, however,
figures to be part of the solution.

INTRODUCTION
Currently, Guatemala is experiencing a triple revolution involving
changes from war to peace, authoritarianism to participatory democracy, and a state-centered economy to a global market. Since 1985,
Guatemala's political structure has consisted of constitutional governments and democratically-elected presidents. One of the most
formidable obstacles confronting the peace process, however, has
been a national-level climate of violence. Consequently, the assassination of Monsignor Juan Girardi Conedera' has emerged as the focal point of discussions about impunity and the need for effective
justice.2
In addition to the widespread violence, there is a pressing need to
address human rights concerns. According to the Commission for
Historical Clarification, the thirty-five year fratricidal war, from
1962 to 1996, killed about 200,000 people. Untold thousands of
cases of human rights violations and acts of violence occurred during
that period. At the same time, impunity permeated Guatemala to such
1. Bishop Girardi was one of the most important human rights
Guatemala until he was murdered on April 26, 1998. Girardi
Archbishop's Office on Human Rights. He was killed a week after
four volume treatise on human rights abuses in Guatemala entitled,
NUNCA Ms [Guatemala: Never Again].

advocates in
had led the
publishing a
GU.4TF_%I.4L4:

2. See INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, MISSION
REPORT ON COMPLIANCE 6, Democracia en Guatemala: La Misi6n de tin Pueblo

Entero [Democracy in Guatemala: the Mission of an Entire Commini v] (1998)
(listing various persistent examples of impediments to peace, security, and justice
in Guatemala).
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an extent that it consumed not only the justice sector but also the
State itself. In particular, women and children were victims of this
lawlessness. The Guatemalan Government regarded the Mayan
population as the collective enemy of the State. The justice system,
nonexistent in large areas of Guatemala before the war, was further
weakened when the court system submitted to the demands of the
dominant national security apparatus. The courts were incapable of
investigating, trying, judging, or punishing even a small number of
those responsible for the most serious abuses. 3
The Peace Accords4 note that the justice system in Guatemala is
flawed. Corruption, inefficiency, slow and antiquated practices and
procedures, a lack of modem office management techniques, corruption, and inefficiency plague the system of justice.' The peace process called for an end to impunity and corruption." Today, ordinary
crime is a significant problem in Guatemala. Furthermore, domestic
violence against women has reached critical levels, accounting for
more than forty percent of murdered women in Guatemala.' Other
crimes such as lynching and vigilantism have added to the increase
3. See COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION, Guatemala: Memor , of
Silence - Conclusions and Recommendations 36, para. 94 (1999) (attributing the
lack of judicial safeguards for individuals being investigated in either military or
ordinary tribunals as a lack of impartiality in the former and a general attitude of
resignation in the latter).
4. See generally THE GUATEMALAN PEACE AGREEMENTS, U.N. Sales No.
E.98 1.17 (1998) [hereinafter Peace Accords] (containing a series of accords
reached by rival groups in Guatemala to establish peace).
5. See U.N., Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the
Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society, para. 8, in THE GUATEMALAN
PEACE AGREEMENTS 129, 133, U.N. Sales No. E.98 1.17 (1998) [hereinafter
Strengthening of Civilian Power] (attributing the main weaknesses of the Guatemalan State to a flawed system of administration justice).
6. See id. para. 9 (advising that a reform of the system of administration of
justice must maintain a goal of ensuring a basic right to justice through "impartiality, objectivity, universality [,] and equality before the law").
7. See Steven E. Hendrix, Innovation in Criminal Procedure in Latin America: Guatemala'sConversion to the Adversarial System, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM.
365, 367-73 (1998) (listing thefts, robberies, kidnapping, and general corruption as
some of the more serious crimes facing Guatemala today).
8. See Increasing Women's Access to Justice, VITAL VOICES (USAID, Washington, D.C.), 1999, at 5 (outlining USAID's initiatives toward increasing
women's access to justice in Guatemala).
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in violence. 9
In large part, according to the Guatemalan Supreme Court, these
problems are due to the justice system's weak response to demands
for reform, lack of communication, and the disorganized justice
structure.' An encompassing solution that strengthens and restructures the formal justice system, including court, municipal representatives, police, prosecution, and others is necessary." In addressing
these concerns, the obvious challenge is to make justice work effectively. According to one of the Peace Commissions, courts must be
the epicenter for resolving conflicts, assisting victims, and healing
the country.'2 Courts, prosecutors, police, and public defenders need
to coordinate to improve public service and the justice system." In
addition international donors can play an instrumental role by supporting the dynamic process of reform in Guatemala."' The "Justice
Center"' 5 represents USAID's latest initiative to improve the justice
9. See COMISION DE FORTALECIMIENTrO DE LA JUSTICIA, RESUMEN EJECLTIVO
DEL INFORME FINAL: UNA NUEVA JUSTICIA PARA LA PAZ [COMMISSION ON THE
STRENGTHENING OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF TilE FINAL REPORT: A

NEw JUSTICE FOR THE PEACE] 47 (1998)
SUMMARY].

[hereinafter JUSTICE EXECLTIVE

10. See id. at 15.
11. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, Director of Centro de Apoyo al Estado
de Derecho [Center for the Advancement of the Rule of Law], USAID TeleConference in Chichicastenango, Guatemala (Sept. 23, 1999) (finding that problems involving communications and structure are weakening the justice system's
ability to respond).
12. See JUSTICE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9,at 13 (enumerating the
points to emphasize in re-conceptualizing the justice system in Guatemala).
13. See id. at 14 (arguing that these distinct groups need to be developed simultaneously and cohesively). This recommendation coheres with the approach the
Guatemalan Bar Association advocates. See COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS Y NOTARIOS
DE GUATEMALA, DIAGN6STICO DE LA ADMINISTRACION DE LA JUSTICIA PENAL
[GUATEMALAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM] 20 (1998) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
DIAGNOSTIC] (recommending regional and multi-sector reform of the various ad-

ministrations of justice).
14. See JUSTICE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 15 (finding that inter-

national cooperation can play a critical role in reforming administrative justice
systems); see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM DIAGNOSTIC, supra note 13, at 21
(calling for international cooperation and input in strengthening the judicial proc-

ess).
15. See inif-a Part I (defining "Justice Centers").
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I. CONDITIONS BEFORE THE JUSTICE CENTER
ARRIVED
Prior to opening the Justice Centers, USAID found many factors
contributing to the weakness of the Guatemalan justice system.
These factors included: vertical organizational structures with investigative work delegated to untrained and unprepared officials; little
cooperation between police and prosecution; no case intake system,
no case tracking or filing systems, or even space for their existence;
no definition of role or function for the Victim's Assistance Office;
little use of plea-bargaining because its application and advantages
were unknown, given that it was banned in Guatemala until 1994;
and little use of any other dispute resolution mechanism other than a

16. See Los Estados Unidos apoya Programa de Justicia para Guatemala
[United States Supports Guatemalan Justice Program], DIARIO DE CENTRO
AMtRICA, Nov. 21, 1999, at 4 (reporting that the United States, through USAID,
set aside twelve million dollars in support of Guatemalan judicial reform programs
such as the Justice Program, which directs assistance to Guatemala's most vulnerable sectors). Harvard University Law School undertook the first USAID effort in
1986. See DPK CONSULTING, FINAL REPORT RELATED TO THE GUATEMALA
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE PROJECT 6 (Jan. 1998) [hereinafter DPK FINAL
REPORT] (outlining chronologically the Justice Project's development, noting ini-

tial start-up problems and eventual success). The second project in the sector was
the "Improved Administration of Justice Project," carried out by Checchi and
Company Consulting, Inc., in 1988. See id. That project produced many diagnostics that focused attention on the problems in the system. See id. The supporters
suspended these efforts in 1991, remarking that they would maintain the suspension "until the Government of Guatemala could demonstrate a more active interest
in reforming the criminal justice system in Guatemala." Id. (quoting USAID
statement made at the time). In 1994, with a new Criminal Procedure Code in
place, USAID awarded a new technical assistance contract to DPK Consulting,
after a competitive bidding process. See id. DPK created a local office in Guatemala City known as the "Centro de Apoyo al Estado de Derecho - CREA/USAID"
[CREA/USAID Center for the Advancement of the Rule of Law]. See DPK FINAL
REPORT, supra note 16, at 6. The original DPK contract ran through December
1997. See id. USAID provided DPK a new contract on a non-competitive basis
from January 1998 through June 1999. See id. In May 1999, USAID awarded another justice sector contract to Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., after a
competitive bidding process. See id.
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full trial. 7
Despite many problems confronting the justice system, the Justice
Center experience confirms that, if the Guatemalan government allows its people to participate in the solution, their ability to overcome
problems should not be underestimated.' In this context, the notion
of a Justice Center was born. The USAID's role was one of facilitation as local actors received credit for the new Justice Centers." In
addition, the new Criminal Procedure Code has been instrumental in
the success of the Centers within the broader context of legal reform
and innovation."

II. DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE
JUSTICE CENTERS
USAID originally referred to Justice Centers as "Focus Centers"
because USAID was "focusing" resources in particular geographic
locations. 2' Regardless of what USAID calls them, the key idea is to
make justice more effective-more efficient and integrated-in a
particular geographic location." Originally, USAID thought an increase in resources included only training, however, it soon realized
that the program required much more. The new initiatives called for
functionally integrated institutions, streamlining procedures, coordinating within and among programs, and gaining the support of the
local Bar associations, civil society, communities, and municipali17. See Memorandum from Erhardt Rupprecht, USAID/Guatemala Acting Director, to Ambassador Donald Planty (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter 05/15198 Rupprecht Mem.] (reporting on the status of USAID Justice Centers at various locations throughout Guatemala) (on file with the author).
18. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, supra note I1.
19. See id.
20. See Hendrix, supra note 7, at 365 (discussing extensively the impact of the
new Guatemalan Code of Criminal Procedure).
21. See Memorandum from Jeff Borns & Steven E. Hendrix, USAID Democracy Officers, to George Carer, USAID/Guatemala Mission Director (Sept. 18,
1998) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 09/18f98 Bors & Hendrix Mem.]
(commenting on Justice Center program progress). While the term "Focus Center"
remained in use for some time, and is still sometimes used today, this paper will
refer to the more generic term of "Justice Center." However, it should be understood that the two terms refer to the same notion.
22. See id.
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ties.2 ' The Justice Centers emerged as laboratories of positive activities consisting of concepts that were introduced, tested, and demonstrated.24 It ultimately meant computerizing some aspects of the effort, including case intake and case tracking," and reorganizing
offices to eliminate highly vertical structures.2 6
Each existing Justice Center is somewhat distinct. The impact of
such initiatives differ among locations, depending in part on varying
levels of local interest and needs. Consequently, while discussing a
Justice Center as a "model," it is imperative to bear in mind that the
"model" varies among jurisdictions.27 A Justice Center is not a physical location, but an entire concept 28 that involves bringing together
civil society and local justice sector officials to address access concerns at the local level. 29 The purpose of the Justice Centers is to in-

crease the quality of justice sector services, especially for historically
marginalized people, such as the poor, women, ° indigenous people,

23. See id.
24. See DPK FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 9 (describing the general understanding at the time that progress was impossible in Guatemala City, due to the
lack of coordination between existing justice center institutions, and that centers in
the country would probably prove more successful).
25. See Quarterly Progress Report No. 8, DPK CONSULTING (CREAIUSAID,
Guatemala, C.A.), Dec. 1996, at 12 [hereinafter QPR No. 8] (outlining
CREA/USAID's plan to develop the Public Ministry's information systems, which
would subsequently allow it to do tasks previously impossible).
26. See 09/18/98 Bors & Hendrix Mem., supra note 21.
27. See id.
28. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, supra note 11.
29. See id.
30. See Memorandum from George Carner, USAID Mission Director, to Ambassador Donald J. Planty, United States Ambassador to Guatemala (July 3 1,
1998) [hereinafter 07/31/98 Carner Mem.] (describing USAID's justice program
initiative to instruct on legal processes in domestic violence cases); see also
Memorandum from George Carner, USAID Mission Director, to Ambassador
Donald J. Planty, United States Ambassador to Guatemala (Sept. 18, 1998) [hereinafter 09/18/98 Carmer Mem.] (reporting on scheduled training seminars on domestic violence for prosecutors, judges, public defenders, and members of the bar).
These efforts have been combined with public information campaigns. For example, in September 1998, USAID sponsored both with the National Association for
Women at the Quetzaltenango Fair to distribute literature on violence against
women. See Memorandum from George Carner, USAID Mission Director, to Ambassador Donald J. Planty, United States Ambassador to Guatemala (Sept. I1,
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and children.' The Justice Center methodology calls for local participants to discuss issues and arrive at a consensus to address local
problems.
Good communication at the local level has been the key
32
thus far.
Stated another way, the core ingredient of the Centers is the people. The Justice Centers advance a joining of ideas and a voluntary
effort to break with traditional structures. The Justice Centers consider diverse views, for example, those of the indigenous population,
police, litigants, judges, civil society, and women's groups, to detect
problems and formulate solutions. This philosophy does not require
an outside donor or outside financial support; rather it depends primarily on the people themselves."
While underway, Justice Centers must contend with historic
problems of poor communication and few linkages between the official justice sector and civil society. In the Justice Centers, local actors converge to discuss the situation and define courses of action.
Such concerns include asking whether such problems are structural,
human, or cultural. The actors discuss the local reality and begin a
process of increasing access to better-quality justice." Justice Centers
serve to involve all principle actors within a specific geographic jurisdiction in an integrated and coordinated effort to provide local
population groups with greater access to justice. These actors include
judges, public defenders, prosecutors, private law practitioners, police, municipal representatives, ambulance teams with firemen, and
civil society. Justice Centers take advantage of new organizational
and information management structures that promote teamwork to
1999) [hereinafter 09/11/99 Carer Mem.] (noting planned attendance in an upcoming Quetzaltenango Fair to distribute information materials on women's legal
rights). Similar efforts have been undertaken at the Esquintla Justice Center. See
Memorandum of Mark Williams, USAID Justice Centers' Coordinator, to Brian
Treacy, USAID Justice Chief of Party 3 (Aug. 19, 1999) [hereinafter 08/19/99
Williams Mem.] (commenting on the state of the Quetzaltenango effort). See generally Increasing Women's Access to Justice, supra note 8, at 5 (noting the accomplishments of Guatemala's Justice Centers in reducing violence against women).
31. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, supra note 11.
32.
33.
34.
access

See id.
See id.
See id. (articulating positive advances in Guatemala, including increased
to justice and increased civic participation).
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provide better quality public services."
The composition, physical layout, and functioning of Justice Centers vary according to local conditions, the special needs of the justice sector officials, availability of resources (monetary and others,
e.g., electricity), and particular issues related to the geographic area
(e.g., incidence and type of criminal activity). 6 Diversity notwithstanding, Justice Centers contain the following common characteristics. First, all Justice Centers have organizational and administrative
structures that reduce delay, minimize exposure to corruption, create
accountability, and establish uniform practices, performance standards, and systems to measure performance. This includes modernized docket and case-filing systems, streamlined case processing,
case-filter systems, central-filing systems, unified clerk of court administration, and other related activities.
Second, all Justice Centers strive to improve the functions of key
actors in their assigned roles and management structures and techniques that promote team approaches (including greater policeprosecutor cooperation). Third, all Justice Centers use standardized,
user-friendly forms, uniform across all Justice Centers, as approved
by the respective Government of Guatemala ("GOG") institutions,
for the reporting and processing of crimes. Fourth, all Justice Centers
have user-friendly case management and records systems that reduce
opportunities for corruption, improve the quality of case supervision,
and generate accurate statistics (case type, status, assignment, progress, and other appropriate monitoring data, as approved by the
Court). Where possible, the courts computerize these systems with a
user-friendly software package acceptable to the GOG. Fifth, Justice
Centers seek to incorporate interpreters and culturally-appropriate
outreach and education programs in local languages to make the
system truly accessible to non-native Spanish speakers. This includes
a public information campaign on how to access the system. The last
component promotes alternative dispute resolution, plea-bargaining

35. See USAID/Guatemala, Section "C," Request for Proposal No. 520-98P020 (Sept. 30, 1998) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Section C Request]
(stating that, among other advances, the Centers have installed modernized casefiling and docket systems).
36. See id. (noting that this team approach to dispute resolution and problem
solving better serves the public).
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("criterio de oportunidad"), stay of prosecution ("suspensi6n condicional"), and other mechanisms to settle cases identified through improved case intake and diversion programs.
Key justice sector counterparts have signaled their commitment to
the Justice Center model and replicate the USAID model in other regions of Guatemala.38 Nevertheless, given the evolving nature of the
model and the diversity of locations, continuous communication and
updating is required. USAID continues to coordinate and work with
the Guatemalan Government to institutionalize the Justice Center
model through dialogue, regular briefings, and information exchanges with members of the main justice sector institutions via the
Coordination Unit for the Modernization of the Justice Sector ("Instancia Coordinadorapara la Modernizaci6n del Sector de Justicia"
or "ICMSJ"). 9
USAID started the first Justice Center, with backing from the
Guatemalan Supreme Court and Attorney General, in October 1995
in Quetzaltenango. 4° The second Justice Center opened in Zacapa in
37. See Crsar Barrientos Pellecer, Centros de Enfoque o Centros de Justicia y
CAJs 4-5 [Focus Centers or Justice Centers and CAJs] (Dec. 1998) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Instancia Coordinadora para ia Modemizaci6n del
Sector Justicia [Coordiated Organization for the Modernization of the Justice
Sector]) (translation by author) (listing the model criteria used by the different Justice Centers). See generally Section C Request, supra note 35 (discussing general
Justice Centers in different regions of Guatemala).
38. See Section C Request, supra note 35 (listing other organizations committed to assisting the Justice Sector, including the Narcotics Affair Section ("NAS")
of the United States Embassy and the United States Department of Justice); see
also Annette Pearson de GonzAlez, Formulaci6n de una Propuesta para la Creaci6n
de Ocho Centros de Administraci6n de Justicia en Guatemala Durante el Periodo
2000-04 [Formulation of A Proposal to Create Eight Justice Administration
Centers in Guatemala For the Period 2000-2004] 63 (May 1998).
39. See Gonzilez, supra note 38, at 63 (noting the importance of coordinating
meetings every fifteen days to discuss problems affecting the efficiency of the penal system). The Instancia Coordinadorais comprised of the Attorney General,
President of the Court, Director of the Public Defense Service, and the Interior
Minister. See generally Gabriela Judith Vdsquez Smerilli & H6ctor Hugo P6rez
Aguilera, Consultoria para la Secretaria Ejecutiva de la ICMSJ [Consultory for the
Executive Secretary of the ICMSJ] (June 1999) (unpublished materials on file with
the author) (emphasizing the key role of the Instancia Coordinadora in the development of the Justice Centers).
40. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, supra note 1 (discussing the history
of the regional Justice Centers, including where they are located, and when they
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June 1996," while in February 1997, the United Nations Human
Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala ("Misi6n de Naciones
Unidas para la Verificaci6n de los Derechos Humanos en Guatemala" or "MINUGUA") inaugurated the Nebaj Center. 2 USAID
joined the Nebaj effort in March 1998. 4' Escuintla's Center became
operational on March 9, 1998, as a result of a meeting of judges,
public defenders, and prosecutors." San Benito's Center (Pet~n Department) began with a participatory meeting of similar local actors
on March 12, 1998. 41 MINUGUA inaugurated the Santa Eulalia

(Huehuetenango) Center on April 30, 1999, with funds from Canada
and technical assistance from USAID. 4'6 The justice system applied
were established); see also QPR No. 8, supra note 25, at 13 (noting that USAID
advised and consulted MINUGUA about the Quetzaltenango Center). MINUGUA
even participated in providing some training in the criminal defense area. See id.
41. See QPR No. 8, supra note 25, at 12.
42. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, supra note 11 (noting that the NebajQuich6 Justice Center markets the implementation of reconstruction within the
formal justice system).
43. See 05/15/98 Rupprecht Mem., supra note 17 (offering a brief history of
the Justice Center starting in Escuintla, Nebaj, and Paten in March 1998). The Instancia foresaw that future CAJs would receive support based on the USAID Justice Center model. See Pellecer, supra note 37, at 5 (noting the central role of the
USAID model).
44. See Minutes of Meeting in Escuintla, Guatemala (Mar. 9, 1998) (on file
with the author) (explaining the concepts discussed at the meeting). Escumtla is a
particularly difficult place for a Justice Center. The Public Ministry receives
12,000 cases per year and, in March 1998, had about 30,000 backlogged cases.
Memorandum of USAID Timothy Cornish, USAID Justice Chief of Party, to Steven Hendrix, USAID Justice Coordinator (Mar. 10. 1998) [hereinafter 03/10/98
Cornish Mem.].
45. See Memorandum from Marisela Velasco de Paniagua, USAID Consultant,
to Alicia Warde, USAID Consultant (Mar. 16, 1998) [hereinafter 03/16/98 Velasco
de Paniagua Mem.] (listing the participants of the meeting to create a center in San
Benito). The Instancia Coordinadora approved the Pet~n and Escuintla Justice
Centers and requested USAID assistance in both locations on February 26, 1998.
See Letter from William Stacy Rhodes, USAID Director, to Attorney General
Hector Hugo Perez Aguilera, Court President Alfredo Figueroa, and Interior Minister Rodolfo Mendoza (Mar. 16, 1998) [hereinafter 03/16/98 Rhodes Letter] (emphasizing the need for collaboration and cooperation in the developing new Justice
Centers).
46. See Memorandum from George Carner, USAID/Guatemala Mission Director, to U.S. Ambassador Donald Planty (April 20, 1999) [hereinafter 04/20/99
Carner Mem.] (inviting the Ambassador to attend the opening of the newest CAJ).
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the administrative advances from the Justice Centers to Guatemala's
criminal courts in October 1998."7 At the close of 1999, the Instancia
Coordinadora requested that USAID establish another Center in
Santa Cruz del Quich6.48 In total, Justice Centers, in various stages of
development, exist in Nebaj (Quich6), Escuintla, Nebaj, Quetzaltenango, San Benito (Petrn), Santa Cruz del QuichtM, Santa Eulalia
(Huehuetenango), and Zacapa.49
In terms of process, the Justice Centers have several standard
characteristics. There are periodic coordination meetings with the
main Justice Center actors, including judges, prosecutors, investigators, police, law school faculty, private lawyers, community representatives, and others. Furthermore, there are periodic training programs at Justice Center location to assure that efforts are integrated
and on track.50

III. ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
STRUCTURES; CASE MANAGEMENT AND
RECORDS SYSTEMS
USAID provided technical assistance to both the Court and the
Public Ministry to modernize their organizational and administrative
structures, striving toward enhancing case management and records
handling. For both the Court and the Public Ministry, the proposals
involved reorganization of case intake, centralization of information,
and rearrangement of physical space with computerization."' The two
47. See Section C Request, supra note 35 (stating that the principle objective of
USAID during the years of 1994-97 was to implement a new criminal procedure
code).
48. See Letter from Astrid Lemus, USAID Executive Secretary, to Brian
Treacy, USAID Justice Chief of Party (Nov. 25, 1999) [hereinafter 11/25,99 Lemus Letter] (soliciting the collaboration of the Instancia to construct a new center).
49. See Section C Request, supra note 35 (emphasizing the cooperation between USAID and MINUGUA in integrating administrative advances from existing centers into new ones).
50. See Gonzdlez, supra note 38, at 63 (discussing the coordination of efforts
by different actors to encourage cohesion and efficiency). To date, the Center coordinators have been local Guatemalans paid by USAID. See hL There is a movement, however, to have these individuals moved to the government's payroll over
time to make the efforts more sustainable. See id.
51. See id. at 63-64 (observing the efforts by the Public Ministry and the Court
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institutions took very different paths, with the Court having great
success. The Public Ministry, after some initial promise, retreated
from organizational streamlining, but retained other elements of the
Justice Center model, including case management practices and integrated training.
A. WITHIN THE COURT SYSTEM
Starting in April 1996, the Quetzaltenango Justice Center inaugurated a new court organization structure, providing transparency and
efficiency to the court." The new structure boasted a single register
("registro tinico ") implemented by a communal secretary ("secretar/a comkn ")." Under the previous system, the courts tracked indi-

vidual cases in seventeen different books or ledgers. The registro
4
tnico simplified this process by replacing them with a single book.
Pooling the secretarial staff under the secretaria-comin system re-

duced the number of people handling each case from twenty-five to
six.55 Now, the time spent 6locating a file has dropped from one week
to nearly instantaneously.1
Based on the successes of the Quetzaltenango experience, planning began in May 1998 for a Clerk of Courts Office for Guatemala
City. 7 The Clerk of Courts Office, which administers the ten Guateto reorganize the current systems to that of the USAID model).
52. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, supra note 11.
53. See Briefing by Timothy Cornish, USAID Justice Chief of Party, for members of the Guatemalan Supreme Court (May 22, 1998) [hereinafter Cornish
Briefing] (presenting statistical analysis of the effects of the new structures).
54. See id. (emphasizing the efficiency of the new system). With the single
registro dinico in place, it is now possible to computerize that book. See id. This has
been done via the Centro de Recepci6n, Registro e Informaci6n ("CRRI") [Center
of Reception, Registration, and Information]. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, supra note 11; see also Steven E. Hendrix, Clerks Office-Guatemala City (Oct. 1, 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the author) (stating that the request for assistance from the Court for the
Clerk's Office came to USAID in September 1996); Minutes of the Supreme Court
Plenary Session, Acta 10-98, para. 4 (Mar. 11, 1998) (formalizing request by Court
for assistance). The approval of the final design came on July 29, 1998. See
Memorandum from George Carer, USAID Mission Director, to Donald J. Planty,
United States Ambassador to Guatemala (July 31, 1998). The Clerk's office was
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mala City criminal courts, does not represent a new "Justice Center,"
but rather is a very positive outgrowth of the Justice Center experience.5 ' The planning process took on several dimensions.9 First, the
formation of a "secretarios" committee to participate in the implementation process and assure that the public viewed the office as a
Guatemalan-not USAID--model, was key.'o A second integral step
in the planning process was advanced work on the automated docket
book and case control program. The Zacapa Justice Center piloted
this process before opening at the Clerk's Office in October of
1998.6' This was the first Clerk of Courts Office beyond a pilot effort
in a Latin American capital city.62
The approach to the Clerk's Office was simple; the most important
design element was the employees, and the number-one objective
was to provide transparent and efficient service to the public. USAID

inaugurated on October 5, 1998. Memorandum from George Carner, USAID Mission Director, to Donald J. Planty, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala (Oct. 9, 1998).
58. See Email from Timothy Cornish, Justice Sector Advisor, to Steven E.
Hendrix, Justice Program Coordinator (Nov. 15, 1999) [hereinafter 11/15/99 Cornish Email] (arguing that the ten capital area courts are positive outgrowths of the
focus centers).
59. See 05/15/98 Rupprecht Mem., supra note 17 (listing the findings of the
current system and addressing the problems).
60. See id. (noting the formation of committees at each center location to include police, prosecutors, public defenders, and judges).
61. See Minutes of the Supreme Court Plenary Session, Acta 10-98, para. 4
(Mar. 11, 1998); see also 05/15/98 Rupprecht Mem., supra note 17 (emphasizing
the advances of the automated docket systems and its eventual country-wide implementation).
62. See Cable from Donald J. Planty, United States Ambassador to Guatemala,
Guatemala Comes Closer to Justice for All (Feb. 22, 1999) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter Ambassador Planty Cable] (stating that USAID helped Guatemala establish clerk of courts offices in various justice centers, which have demonstrated
improved services). Peru has a small pilot effort in Lambayeque, and Costa Rica
has a similar pilot in Guadelupe, Costa Rica. See id. However, the Guatemalan
Clerk of Courts Office is a first for a Latin American capital city. See id. It underscores the Court's commitment to the Justice Center model, since the Clerk's Office is modeled on efforts in Zacapa and Quetzaltenango. In this sense, USAID's
Justice Center model has been institutionalized. See Note from Steven Hendrix,
USAID Justice Program Coordinator, to Elizabeth Hogan, USAID Democracy
Program Chief (Nov. 20, 1997) (discussing the Court's decision on November 17,
1997, to expand the Justice Center model to the capital in the form of a Clerk of
Courts).
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paid no salaries to public officials, and purchased none of the equipment. Instead, USAID concentrated its resources in technical assistance to accompany and guide a Guatemalan-led participatory design
effort, and its subsequent implementation. In doing so, the effort has
assured complete institutional buy-in from the Guatemalan Supreme
Court down to the file clerks. Moreover, system users, including litigants, the public and victims, can now demand a higher standard of
quality, transparency, and efficiency. 61
In just one year, the impact of efforts to reduce opportunities for
corruption and to increase transparency is clear. First, the court system now has an inventory of its caseloads. Previously, parties paid
corrupt officials to "lose" case files.6 From October 1, 1996 to September 31, 1997, the court system "lost" 1,061 cases in Guatemala
City alone. 65 This represents 1,061 accused individuals, many of
whom remained in jail without having enjoyed their day in court, in
violation of their human rights. Under the new system, from October
1, 1998 to September 31, 1999, only one has been "lost, 6 6 representing an important advance in human rights as well as a more than
ninety-nine percent decrease in opportunities for impunity, and an
increased efficiency of office administration. Second, for the first
time ever, there is an equitable and transparent distribution of cases
under the new system. Consequently, the system is decongested, and
the court hears cases, rather than let them sit stagnant and devoid of
67
t
scrutiny. Third, the system now automatically respects legal time
63. See Hendrix, supra note 57 (noting the drastic reduction in corruption
within a short time of implementation).
64. See id. (listing the positive impacts of the newly-implemented program on
reducing corruption). The 1,061 "lost case" figure actually represents data from six
of the ten Guatemala City Courts. In four courts, case management was so poor
that reliable statistics were impossible. Actual loss may have been twice the 1,061
figure.
65. See id. (stating that from October 1, 1996, to August 31, 1999, only five
cases have been lost in Guatemala City). Since then, four have been recovered.
66. See id. (indicating that between October 1998 and September 1999 five
files were "lost" under the Court's new system). On a site visit on November 4, the
Director of the Center was able to confirm that four of the previously lost files had
been found.
67. See id. (outlining the benefits of the new Court system); see also 11/15/99
Cornish Email, supra note 58 (noting that prior to the October 1998 modernization,
the system assigned courts to one or more of the several zones of the city, often

2000)

GUA TEMALAN JUSTICE CENTERS

limits. Previously, there was no control over how long processes
would extend. Fourth, under the new system, courts have cut in half
the number of cases where the defendant was unascertainable. Fifth,
for the first time ever, there is a reliable system for generating statistics and reports on court actions.
The Guatemalan Supreme Court praised the new Clerk's office
structure and operation. After six months of operation, the Court requested that USA-D support extend the new methodologies in a
computerized format-the "Centro de Recepci6n, Registro e Injbrnzaci6n" or "CRR'--back to all the Justice Centers, a task that was
complete by June 15,

1999.61

B. WITHIN THE PUBLIC MINISTRY
In late 1996, USAID sponsored a study visit for Guatemalan justice sector actors to Chihuahua, Mexico, where the Public Ministry
assembled a case-intake and investigation unit to provide a model for
accusatorial prosecutions throughout Latin America."' This study
visit included the participation of Guatemala's Attorney General, top
prosecutors, and police officials. After the trip, the participants defined a plan of action for implementation in the Guatemalan Justice

Centers. One key component of the plan was a case tracking and
control system for the Public Ministry, promising a profound impact
on the Public Ministry's method of doing business. In addition, the

resulting in an unequal division of caseload). Meanwhile, the staff size was the
same for each court. See id. Within each court, private law firms could place a
picked "oficial" who would handle the case, for an appropriate compensation
price. See id. The Clerk's Office has reallocated 'oficiales" to a central location,
removing illegal delegation of work from judges to "oficiales," and taking control
of cases out of the hands of the unsupervised non-judge oficiales, who were the
primary source of corruption in the system. See id. Previously, if one did not pay
the oficial, the case did not move. See id. Conversely, you could pay an ofichd to
assure that the case never moved. See 11/15/99 Cornish Email, supra note 58.
68. See Memorandum from Letitia Kelly Butler, USAID Acting Director, to
Donald J. Planty, United States Ambassador to Guatemala (May 28, 1999) (on file
with the author) [hereinafter 05/28/99 Butler Mem.] (detailing plans to continue
the modernization program instituted in pilot Justice Centers throughout the country).
69. See QPR No. 8, supra note 25, at 8 (noting that the visit exposed participants to the benefits of mediation in the criminal process. which has helped to dispose of criminal complaints without involving police and prosecutorial resources).
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plan promised more accurate statistics and performance monitoring.
In February 1997, Guatemala's Attorney General formally approved
the plan and design elements. 0
As the first Justice Center in Quetzaltenango adopted the new
system, results were immediately visible. The implementation of a
case index system dramatically decreased the time necessary to
search for cases from two hours to ten minutes. 71 Furthermore, the
total number of cases were reduced due to the implementation of a
case-screening unit, which discovered, after a review of submitted
cases, that many are dropped for lack of criminal content or because
they are undesirable for prosecution. Specialized units were created
to professionalize criminal prosecutions such as homicide, property
crimes, and high impact crimes (drugs, kidnapping, auto theft). The
new system eliminated the double assignment of cases to different
prosecutors, which had been a problem before implementation. Specialized personnel increased the efficiency of investigations and trial
presentations, 3 making investigations more complete. Moreover,
prosecutors were able to spend more time on important cases, resulting in fewer "remands" from the trial courts. By June 1997,
Quetzaltenango's Public Ministry boasted two important additional
systems: the centralized filing system ("archivo inico") and the
communal secretary ("secretariacomin.")74

70. See Quarterly ProgressReport No. 9, DPK CONSULTING (CREA/USAID,
Guatemala, C.A.), Jan. 1, 1997 to Mar. 31, 1997, at 8 [hereinafter QPR No. 9] (explaining that the plan would be implemented gradually, to accommodate the institution's technical capabilities, and that the basic case-tracking abilities would
greatly increase efficiency).

71. See id. at 11 (listing the accomplishments of the Public Ministry in Quetzaltenango).
72. See id.
73.

See id.

74. See Quarterly ProgressReport No. 10, DPK CONSULTING (CREA/USAID,

Guatemala, C.A.), Apr. 1, 1997 to June 31, 1997, at 15 (explaining that "archivo
finico" is a single location for filing of cases disposing of the previous system in
which attorneys maintained their own files). The archivo 6nico went a long way
toward reducing chances of "lost" files, due either to negligence or corruption. It
also provided a major management capability to the District Attorney. The "secretaria comin" was a concentration of support staff into a single pool. See id. Previously, individual attorneys had complete staff, which required supervision. See id.
Prosecutors were in fact managers, with little time to focus on prosecuting. See
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In May 1997, USAID held a coordination meeting with
MINUGUA to discuss recommendations for organizing the Public
Ministry. MINUGUA clearly disagreed with USAID's approach to
the Public Ministry. MINUGUA espoused that prosecutors, like

).76
judges, should be protected with "independence" ("autonomia"

USAID noted that such a structure is contrary to the standards that
control modem prosecutors' offices in that it eliminates teamwork in
complex cases, diminishes chances for the sharing of risk in dangerous cases, heightens the risk of corruption because one person controls a case rather than several, and hampers the ability to replace
prosecutor's in complex cases.7
USAID Justice Chief of Party, Tim Cornish, noted that the traditional Guatemalan Public Ministry organizational concept is a vertical structure. It is "very much like a court in which, in the case of
the capital, an 'agent fiscal' has his own rigidly structured staff that
he administers thereby duplicating the inefficiencies of the courts
and magnifying the opportunities for corruption. "" Under this structure, prosecutors cannot be specialized. In contrast, Colombia, Mexico, Northern Europe or the United States have assistant prosecutors.
These assistant prosecutors are typically specialized (except in small
towns), assigned to teams when involved in important cases, and do
not play a supervisory role with respect to personnel, except perhaps
with respect to a secretary. 0 Without personnel oversight responsi-

generally Memorandum from Maggie Triviz, USAID Justice Consultant, to
Timothy Cornish, USAID Justice Chief of Party (Nov. 17, 1997) (on file with the
author) (noting that, since the secretaria comtin implements the acrhivo 6nico, they
should really be considered a single, integrated system).
75. Memorandum from USAID to MINUGUA (May 15, 1997) (on file with
the author) (discussing the possible connection between CREAJUSAID and
MINUGUA on decentralization programs).
76. See Memorandum from Timothy Cornish, USAID Justice Chief of Party, to
Steven Hendrix, USAID Justice Coordinator (May, 16, 1997) (on file with the
author) [hereinafter 05/16/97 Cornish Mem.].
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. See id. (contrasting MINUGUA's opinion on the role of the assistant prosecutors with that of United States-based models).
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bility, they dedicate nearly all of their time to prosecuting.'
In September 1997, MINUGUA began a review on its own of the
Public Ministry systems in the then two Justice Centers in Zacapa
and Xela.8 While conducting the review, the M1NUGUA advisors
criticized the new streamlined systems directly to Public Ministry officials, without involving USAID. 3 MINUGUA then began drafting
a new plan without USAID input, ignoring two years of intense institutional experience in the Justice Centers addressing the exact
points the new plan pretended to solve. 4 If they had gone to Quetzaltenango or Zacapa while drafting the plan, the authors would have
witnessed the coherent organizational models present there, functioning and addressing the objectives of the plan.8"
In February 1998, Guatemala's Attorney General, Hrctor Hugo
P6rez Aguilera, ceased further efforts in San Benito (Pet6n Depart-

81. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM DIAGNOSTIC, supra note 13, at 21 (asserting that the separation of administrative functions from legal functions will enhance the efficiency ofjustice sector access).
82. See Memorandum from Timothy Cornish, USAID Justice Chief of Party, to
Steven Hendrix and Beth Hogan, USAID Democracy Officers (Sept. 25, 1997) (on
file with the author) (describing events that occurred at the unplanned review of
the Public Ministry systems by MINUGUA members).
83. See id. (noting that the conduct by MINUGUA members was not a new occurrence, but had manifested in other situations).
84. See Letter from Timothy Cornish, USAID Justice Chief of Party, to Steven
Hendrix, USAID Justice Program Coordinator (Mar. 24, 1998) (on file with the
author) (explaining that MINUGUA's plans provided solutions already implemented in both Justice Centers); see also Programade Reogranizaci6ny Regionalizaci6n de las Fiscaliasdel Interior del Pals, MINISTERIO PUBLICO [Program of
Reorganization and Regionalization of District Attorneys, PUBLIC MINISTRY]
(Ministerio Piblico, Guatemala, C.A.), 1998, at 1 (giving MINUGUA credit for
the Reorganization Plan). The plan considered prosecution offices in Amatitlin,
Baja Verapaz, Chimaltenango, Chiquimula, El Progreso, Escuintla, Huehuetenango, Izabal, Jalapa, Jutiapa, Mixco, Quich6, Sacatep~quez, San Marcos,
Sololi, Totonicapdn, and Petrn. See id. The review did not take into account fully
developed structures in the Justice Centers in either Quetzaltenango or Zacapa. See
id. In fact, the plan sought to isolate the experiences in Quetzaltenango and Zacapa. See id. at 12.
85. See Timothy Cornish, Comentarios al Programa de Reorganizaci6n y Regionalizaci6n de las Fiscalias [Commentaries on the Reorganization and Regionlization of the District Attorneys Plan] (Mar. 24, 1998) (unpublished manuscript on
file with the author) (noting that the Public Ministry's adopted plan was contrary to
modem principles of organization for prosecutors' offices).
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ment) and Escuintla to streamline organizational structures, pending
a reorganization study with MINUGUA.' In mid-1998, the Public
Ministry released the "Reorganization Plan."" Contrary to the trend
in adversarial/accusatory systems, the Guatemalan Attorney General
formalized a highly vertical model of organizational structure." The
new structure is based on small, self-contained operational units
called "agencias." Each agencia contains one assistant district attorney (or "agentefiscal"), a certain number of sub-assistant district
attorneys ("auxiliares") and a certain number of support personnel
("oficiaes").°
Although the agencias function within each district attorney's office, they operate semi-independently. Communication within each
district attorney's office (and at other levels) is only as good as each
agentefiscal wants it to be. Conceptually, in many instances, each
agentefiscal considers himself cloaked with a type of judicial independence, removing himself from supervision by the district attorney, or even the attorney general, as though he were in fact a judge
rather than a prosecutor. Making matters worse, the Reorganization
Plan effectively removes district attorneys as supervisors, and places
attorney generals in charge of an agencia, thus exacerbating the
fragmentation and compartmentalization of each agenciafiscal.Under these circumstances, not even the implementation of sophisticated information-sharing systems will entirely solve communication

86. See Letter from Hctor Hugo P&rez Aguilera, Guatemalan Attorney General, to Timothy Cornish, USAID Justice Chief of Party (Feb. 13, 1998) (on file
with the author) (commenting on the reasons behind the suspension of CREA's organizational efforts). Curiously, Petn and Escuintla were two places to be visited
by the MINUGUA team carrying out the review.
87. See

generally MINISTERIO

Pt)BLICO-FISCALIA

GENERAL

DE

LA

REPOBLICA, MANUAL DE ORGANIZAZION [PUBLIC MINISTRY-OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC, ORGANIZATION MANUAL] (July 1998) on
file with the author) [hereinafter ORGANIZATION MANUAL] (outlining the responsibilities and functions of the new units created under the Reorganization Plan).
88. See ORGANIZATION MANUAL, supra note 87, at 13 (explaining the new organizational structure).
89. See id. at 4 (noting that the agencias would operate under each district attorney).
90. See Cornish, supra note 85 (explaining the composition of the agencias).

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[15:813

issues. 9'

In Justice Centers in Zacapa and Quetzaltenango, USAID assisted
in establishing specialized prosecution units. The authors of the Reorganization Plan never visited the Justice Centers, 92 as MINUGUA
rejected specialization. The new local model of organization prohibits the establishment of agencias or units by type of crime, for example, property crime, homicide, domestic violence, etc."' Instead, the
model organizes the office on a system of seventy-two-hour shifts, in
which everything except drugs goes to the prosecutor "on call."
This local model is proving weak, fragmented, and entirely incapable
of investigating and prosecuting anything more than the easiest of
cases. 95
A big exception to the decentralization plan concerns organized
crime. A national-level "Agencia Fiscal Contra Crimen Organizado"
was structured in October 1998 to address kidnapping, extortion, car
theft, and child abuse. Previously, only the national level "Narcojiscalia" dealt with cross-border issues. It is unclear if anyone was focusing upon the theme of money laundering. No matter the type of
organized crime, national or international structures with local representation, independent of the local District Attorney, are essential. So
far, however, little progress has been made to make the Organized
Crime Unit operational. 6
Any such specialized unit will require sufficient linkages to assure
appropriate communication with local prosecutorial organizations.
91. See Memorandum from Steven E. Hendrix, USAID Justice Coordinator, to
William Brencick, Deputy Chief of Mission (Dec. 16, 1998) (on file with the
author) [hereinafter 12/16/98 Hendrix Mem.] (describing the consequences of
giving the agenciassemi-independent roles).
92. See ORGANIZATION MANUAL, supra note 87, at 1 (listing the sites that
MINUGUA visited, notably excluding the Justice Centers located in Xela and Zacapa).
93. See 12/16/98 Hendrix Mem., supra note 91 (noting that the Public Ministry
rejected the plan to specialize the prosecutors, which USAID had implemented in
the Justice Centers of Xela and Zacapa).
94. See ORGANIZATION MANUAL, supra note 87, at 15 (outlining the characteristics of the new system).
95. See 12/16/98 Hendrix Mem., supra note 91 (describing the effects of the
new system).
96. See id. (outlining the reasons for the organized crime exception).
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These linkages are necessary because under the present scheme, drug
possession cases are still consigned to the local prosecutor, while the
obvious linkages between possession and trafficking are not made in
local investigations. Moreover, there are few guidelines instructing
local-level prosecutors as to when they should refer cases to the national level.97 The investigation and prosecution of any type of organized crime, from the professional thief to multinational networks
of drug traffickers and money launderers, requires appropriate levels
of communication and team work. The reorganization model does
not respond to these very possible concerns.9'
In this context, restructuring of the prosecution office for greater
efficiency and transparency was undercut in Quetzaltenango,' and,
consequently, nationwide. Until November 1998, the Quetzaltenango
effort had progressed under District Prosecutor Estuardo Barrios."'
USAID had advanced a "secretaria comtn'" administrative model
within the Public Ministry.'0 ' Under Barrios, there was a functioning
Common Clerk's and Filing Office, broad use of standardized forms,
and a functioning case-tracking system. In December of that year,
in the face of the new Reorganization Plan, Barrios resigned and was
replaced by Felipe Perez Santos, who ended all the aforementioned
programs.' 3 Prosecutors simply were unwilling to relinquish control
they exercised over the oficiales and the convenience of delegating
much of the work to these individuals.'
In less than one year, as of September 1999, Quetzaltenango was
'

97. See id. (asserting that the lack of communication in the new system will result in further difficulties for prosecutors).
98. See id. (assessing the defects of the new system).
99. See 05/15/98 Rupprecht Mem., supra note 17 (noting that the rejection of
the "secretaria comdn" was one of the largest setbacks).
100. See 08/18/99 Williams Mem., supra note 30, at 11-12 (commenting on the
state of the Quetzaltenango effort).
101. See 05/15/98 Rupprecht Mem., supra note 17 (discussing URL's assistance
in restructuring the prosecution offices).
102. See 08/18/99 Williams Mem., supra note 30, at 12.
103. See id.
104. See 05/15/98 Rupprecht Mem., supra note 17 (noting prosecutor's role in
the restructuring).
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not processing a backlog of 20,000 active criminal complaint files.""
At the time, a newly assigned Quetzaltenango District Attorney,
Armando Martinez, '°6 was anxious to restart the program and redevelop appropriate filing and tracking systems.' 7 By August 1999,
Zacapa was the only Center remaining using the original USAID
model for streamlined organization with specialized prosecutorial
staff in the Public Ministry.' 8 The Zacapa prosecutors were quite
proud of the system they had in place and were concerned about the
MINUGUA Reorganization Plan, which would arrive in Zacapa later
that same year and dismantle the progress.'09
Despite the setback for the USAID program in terms of the organization component for prosecutorial staff, the Public Ministry has
retained and endorsed other elements of the Justice Center model.
The Public Ministry decided to retain the case tracking and case
management innovations. In addition, it continues to work collaboratively with integrated approaches to justice sector issues."0 Furthermore, even though the Public Ministry, for better or worse,
adopted the MINUGUA Reorganization Plan, it would be of little
surprise if it eventually reversed this decision and moved back in the
direction of specialization, following the regional trend, as part of an
effort to improve performance."'
105. Memorandum from Brian Treacy, USAID Chief of Party, to Steven Hendrix, USAID Justice Program Coordinator (Oct. 18, 1999) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter 10/18/99 Treacy Mem.] (describing the report of Justice Program/USAID activities for September 1999).
106. See 08/18/99 Williams Mem., supra note 30, at 12.
107. See generally 10/18/99 Treacy Mem., supra note 105 (describing MP files
in Quetzaltenango).
108. See 08/18/99 Williams Mem., supra note 30, at 6 (discussing the casetracking system at Zacapa).
109. See id. (noting the prosecutor's fear of a new system).
110. See Restmen Ej~eutivo [Executive Summary], USAID JUSTICE PROGRAM
(CREA/USAID, Guatemala, C.A.), Nov. 1999, at 2 (on file with the author) (providing a summary of the various activities on-going at the various Justice Centers
with involvement by the Public Ministry). The Public Ministry's participation in
these efforts in placed within the broader context of team approaches in the following section. See discussion infra Part F.
11. See Estado de Gesti6n sobre las Denuncias en la Oficina de Atenci6n Permanente del Ministerio Piiblcio: Evaluaci6n Preliminarsobre la Actividad Investigativa del Delito por parte del Ministerio Pfiblico [State of Management Re-
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garding Crime Reporting in the Investigation Office of the Public Ministr,: Prelimzinary Evaluation of the Crime Investigating Activ'itv by the Public Ministry],
MIGUEL A. ESPINO G. (CREAiUSAID, Guatemala, C.A.), Jan. 1999 (on file with
the author) [hereinafter Espino Evahation] (noting that new, reliable statistics are
coming out of the new Clerk of Courts office, which indicate that there is very little activity in criminal cases in general in Guatemala City). In other words, court
documents show that the productivity level of the Public Ministry is dismal. Since
we know crime is ramped, the obvious question is "why?"
In approaching "Atenci6n Permanente," the Public Ministry invited USAID to
review one of the "best" of the 35 "Agencias Fiscales" that make up the Guatemala
City office, which would presumably give USAID data toward a more positive image for the Public Ministry. In Guatemala City alone, Espino reports that there are
roughly 450 cases per day presented to the Public Ministry. See Espino Evahlation,
supra note 111. This translates into about 90,000 new criminal complaints per
year. Of these, about 35,000 per year are immediately dismissed because the reception clerk does not believe they merit the attention of a prosecutor. See it.
There are no established criteria for this decision and the cases never enter the
system for even tracking purposes. See id. Of the remaining cases, just over half
fail to identify clearly the "aggressor." Id. There is an unwritten policy that the
clerks neither enter these cases into the system nor track them. See id. Together,
these incidents represent an under-reporting of crime by about 60,000 or more
criminal complaints per year just in Guatemala City. See Espino Evahation,supra
note 111.
The remaining 30,000 per year (about 2,800 per month) cases that pass an initial
screening and do identify an aggressor are referred to the "Fiscalia de Tumo" (attorney in rotation). See id. There are 35 "fiscalias" (prosecutor teams) for Guatemala City. Each fiscalia has a lead prosecutor, assistant prosecutors, deputy prosecutors, law clerks, and secretaries. Over a three and a half month period, there were
only 328 court filings in these cases, or about 94 per month, or about 2.6 filings per
Agencia Fiscal per month, which is less than one per month per prosecutor! See id.
This level of productivity is disastrous for the Public Ministry. By way of reference, United States prosecutor offices are set up to chum out routine filings by the
hundreds, on a daily basis if necessary.
Where the victim does identify an aggressor, the Public Ministry and the Police
do appear to work together in teams. The average case results in two or three judicial actions, i.e., citaciones a agredidos,citaciones a agresores.solicitudes de investigador, etc. (assault victim citations, assault aggressor citations, investigator
applications), meaning that the Case Intake Unit is in fact processing select cases.
However, in a sample of cases, 100 percent of the victims and witnesses eventually
recanted their testimony, refused to cooperate with investigators, or otherwise
withdrew their complaint. See id. Investigators have told USAID that the victims
fear reprisal. In these cases, the complaint is simply dropped and filed away. No
action is taken against the aggressor. In other words, of the 90,000 criminal complaints filed in a year, actual success in prosecution in statistical terms for Guatemala City approaches zero. Even assuming a wide margin of error in the study, the
results are still catastrophic.
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SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS:
NUMBER
CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS
YEAR
PER

NUMBER PER
MONTH (EST.)

NUMBER
PER

90,000

7,500

450

35,000

2,917

175

34,000

2,800

168

1,125

94

3 to 4

32

2.6

N/A

None in the
sample (0%)

None in
sample

(EST.)

Presented to the Public
Ministry
Not considered, registered
or tracked
Referred to an Agencia
Fiscal
Filings in Court related to
cases*
Filings in Court related to
cases per Agencia Fiscal*
Cases Tried by MP*
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the

(EST.)

None in
sample

DAY

the

* Data Source: Centro Administrativo de Gesti6n Penal(Clerks Office)
Based on this, there is an alarming lack of confidence in the justice system.
Anecdotal evidence suggests there is great fear of reprisal combined with real
functional deficiencies in the sector. See Espino Evaluation, supra note 111. This
translates into lack of citizen participation in legal investigation and prosecution,
even after having presented a claim, which in turn means impunity on a massive
scale for aggressors that the State never detained or prosecuted.
While zero percent of cases in the USAID investigation sample went forward to
prosecution, obviously some cases did make it to court. However, this represents a
statistical aberration. The norm is that people do not file complaints and that those
who do, quickly drop them. Criminals are aware of this and take advantage of the
situation.

Given that no tracking systems exist in Atenci6n Permanente, the Espino
Evaluation is the first empirical look at the office. A justice sector that does not
track its success and failure will not be able to garner resources or establish the
correct policies to effect needed change. The Espino Evaluation clearly exposes
underlying inefficiencies in the Public Ministry, resulting in a shockingly low and
tragic level of productivity by prosecutors. It clearly shows the collapse of the
MINUGUA Reorganization Plan. This undoubtedly must be further documented
and defined.
While changing social attitudes will take a long-term effort, there is a clear need
to up-grade the case-intake unit immediately as a first step in the broader strategy
of changing the image of the justice sector. Clearly the first stage of any such effort
in Atenci6n Permnanente should be to concentrate on upgrading case-intake with
simplified and automated processes to capture data, with a view toward influencing
the institutional policy agenda. Institutional policies will have to change regarding
customer service, protection of witnesses, and swift, effective prosecution of witness harassers and killers. Today, these policies do not exist. Further, the Public
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IV. IMPROVED FUNCTIONING AND TEAM
APPROACHES
Team approaches are instrumental to the Justice Centers. There is
very good cooperation among actors, especially the older centers of
Zacapa and Quetzaltenango. This cooperation is developing in the
newer Centers. In addition, USAID and the justice sector counterparts have both moved to assure the institutionalization of training to
improve conditions." 2
The University of San Carlos ("USAC") is supportive of the Justice Center model."3 The Justice Centers demonstrated that Guatemalan lawyers in general had poor practical trial and lawyering
skills. This forced USAID to adjust its program to address such concerns at an earlier point in attorneys' careers, such as law schools. As
one result of the USAID effort, in 1998, there was more academic research done at USAC than in the prior twenty-three years combined.14 Furthermore, to address the practical needs of addressing indigenous law, USAC created a graduate degree program for
indigenous law, with the assistance of the National Autonomous
University of Mexico ("UNAM") and USAID-a first in Latin
America." 5 The Guatemalan Bar Association also created a decentralized, institutionalized unit for continuing legal education in
1998.16 This unit began offering courses not only in Guatemala City,
but also in the various Justice Centers.'"
Ministry will need to capture and process data to profile criminality and detect
crime patterns (nmodus operandi).
112. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, supra note 11.
113. See Pellecer, supra note 37, at 6 (commenting on the support that Focus
Centers have received from justice-sector institutions).
114. See Ambassador Planty Cable, supra note 62 (discussing work of USAID
to improve trial skills).
115. See id. (describing effects of USAID to utilize unique educational courses
in Latin America).
116. See id. (explaining advanced legal education programs by USAC and

USAID).

117. See id.; see also Quarterly Progress Report No. 3, DPK Consulting
(CREAIUSAID, Guatemala, C.A.), June 1998 to Aug. 1998, at 7-8 [hereinafter
QPR No. 3] (providing that the group Unidad Academica [Academics United] was
planning to establish inter-institutional programs of continuing legal education of
Guatemalan attorneys).
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Other USAID products derived from the Justice Centers, which
represented collaborative efforts between judges, prosecutors, police,
public defenders, and several universities, were the Criminal Investigator's Manual, Evidence Notebook, the Trial Practice Manual,"
and a number of Administrative Procedure Manuals." 9 Furthermore,
the Public Ministry released a new Prosecutor's Manual based on
MINUGUA technical assistance, with input from USAID and the
United States Embassy Narcotics Affairs Office ("NAS"). 20 The
manuals, which took several years to make due to the participatory
process involved, represented an important advance in the Guatemalan legal literature
by advancing practical aspects of criminal law and
121
procedure. No comparable guides were ever previously available.'"
In May 1999, together with the Universidad Rafael Landivar,
USAC, the Bar Association, the Court, Public Ministry, and the
Public Defender Service, USAID piloted a "distance learning" program through the various Justice Centers as a form of continuing legal education. The course focused on criminal trial advocacy and
used the Trial Practice Manual as the core text.' Given the USAID
training for prosecutors in Quetzaltenango from 1996 to 1998, along
with specialization and organizational streamlining, prosecution con-

118. See DPK Final Report, supra note 16, at 12 (noting the use of support materials for justice sector materials).
119. See Pellecer, supra note 37, at 7 (detailing the materials produced in order
to establish the Justice Centers).
120. See Ministerio Piblico--Fiscalia General de la Repfiblica, Manual de Fiscal [Public Ministry-Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, District Attorney Manual] 9-10 (1996) (introducing the new penal code and commenting on
its origin).

121. See Memorandum from George Carner, USAID Mission Director, to Donald J. Planty, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala (Feb. 12, 1999) (on file with the
author) (describing USAID Justice Activity publications).
122. See generally Quarterly Progress Report No. 1, DPK Consulting
(CREA/USAID, Guatemala, C.A.), Feb. 28, 1998, at 6 (noting the departure from
traditional techniques in the evidence course).
123. See Memorandum from Letitia Kelly Butler, USAID Acting Director, to
Donald J. Planty, United States Ambassador to Guatemala (May 21, 1999) (on file
with the author) (discussing innovations in justice-sector training). Another distance learning course focused on criminal law basics. See Escuela de Estudios Judiciales, Universidad de San Carlos, & Ministerio Ptiblico, Centro de Apoyo al
Estado de Derecho CREA/USAID, in La Teoria del Delito (1999).
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viction rates reached ninety percent in 1997 and one hundred percent
in 1998.24 This compares with a national rate of about fifty percent.25
In Escuintla, performance monitoring of the Center's first month of
operation documented a forty-two percent reduction in case assignments for prosecutors as a result of case filter and referral features.'2"
This led to reduced caseloads of prosecutors, allowing them more
time for investigation
and prosecution of cases that merit an attor12
1
attention.
ney's
One of the team approach failures so far has been in the area of
criminal investigation, which requires cooperation between police
and prosecutors.'u As a related matter, one of the clear necessities
detected in the operation of the Justice Centers was the dismal to
non-existent procedures for handling evidence.' By December 1996,
USAID and prosecutors and police officials had worked out draft
text agreement (or "protocolo") between the institutional heads of the
Public Ministry and the Police for improved criminal investigation. ' ,
In October 1998, USAID provided the Public Ministry with a diagnostic on how to improve the handling of evidence, along with pro124. See Memorandum from Erhardt Rupprecht, USAID Acting Director, to
Donald J. Planty, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala (Nov. 6, 1998) (on file with the
author) (noting the increase in the conviction rates after the justice program train-

ing).
125. See id. (discussing the conviction rates in Guatemala).
126. See Ambassador Planty Cable, supra note 62 (discussing reduction in
workload for prosecutors in Guatemala).
127. See id. (noting the efficiency of the new system).
128. See Criminal Justice System Diagnostic, supra note 13, at 13 (recommending that Guatemala strengthen the coordination among government offices
that direct or conduct criminal investigations).
129. See Memorandum from Ernesto D. Velarde, USAID Justice Consultant, to
Angel Estuardo Barrios, Quezaltenanago District Prosecutor (Oct. 27, 1998) (on
file with the author) [hereinafter 10/27/98 Velarde Mem.] (briefing the prosecution
office on observations regarding the deficiencies in the evidence-handling and investigation of the office).
130. See generally Ministerio Pfiblico & Ministerio de Gobernaci6n, Instructivo
General Relativo al Cumplimiento de ia Direcci6n Funcional del Ministerio
Ptblico en la Policia y Dem.s Cuerpos de Investigaci6n Penal [Public Ministry &
Ministry of the Interior, General Instruction Regarding the Coordination of the
Functioning Direction of the Public Ministry with the Police and the other Departments of Criminal Investigation] (Sept. 17, 1997) (unpublished draft on file with

the author).
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posed rules and standard forms for assuring chain of custody and
concrete steps for action. 3 ' On January 12, 1999, Guatemala's Attorney General promised immediate action to approve evidencehandling rules and the protocol for police-prosecutor collaboration."2
So far, little else has developed and the tools remain unused.

V. USE OF STANDARDIZED FORMS
One result of the Justice Center process was the functional integration of administrative tasks, with corresponding increases in efficiency and therefore customer service. On June 12, 1998, the Instancia Coordinadoraadopted uniform formats for sharing information
among the courts, prosecution, and police, including crime reporting
forms (denuncias), pretrial detentions (prevenci6n), detention when
caught in the act (consignaci6nporfragancia),search warrants requested by prosecutors and ordered by judges, crime scene inspection, and autopsy reporting and inspection of cadavers.'33 Incredibly,
before this date, justice sector actors never had standardized forms
for even routine tasks. These new forms were all based on USAID
designs and subsequent consultation and validation process.114
Through the Instancia Coordinadora, USAID then provided training in each of the Justice Centers on use of the new formats." After
the justice center designed the initial fourteen forms, twenty-four
forms were developed, tested, approved, and implemented with
1 6

131. See 10/27/98 Velarde Mem., supra note 129.
132. See Ambassador Planty Cable, supra note 62.
133. See Memorandum from Letitia Kelly Butler, USAID Acting Director, to
Donald J. Planty, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala (June 16, 1998) (on file with the
author) (describing use of standardized formats).
134. See id. (noting the role of USAID in implementing the reforms).
135. See Memorandum from George Carner, USAID Mission Director to Donald J. Planty, United States Ambassador to Guatemala (Sept. 3, 1998) (on file with
the author) [hereinafter 09/03/98 Camer Mem.] (explaining that seminars have already been held in Escuintla, Guatemala City, Nebaj, Pet~n, and Zacapa, with attendance exceeding expectations).
136. See Ambassador Planty Cable, supra note 62 (stating that the Instancia Coordinadora initially approved fourteen forms developed by USAID for national use
by the courts, police, public defense, and prosecution).
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USAID assistance. 31 By December 1998, a performance evaluation
in San Benito (Pet~n) and Escuintla found that the forms were in full
implementation in both locations.'39 Over a hundred forms have been
designed, developed, and introduced at the Justice-Center level. As
they are fturther refined, they will be candidates for later national application.'39

VI. INTERPRETER, CULTURALL-APPROPRIATE
OUTREACH AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS
The Peace Accords and the Justice Strengthening Commission
mandated the need for legal pluralism and access to justice in one's
own language.'40 Human rights can only be guaranteed if the accused,
witnesses, and victims are afforded procedural due process. 4 ' In a
country where half of the population does not speak Spanish as its

native language, 42 the constitutional guarantee of due process means

137. See Memorandum from Letitia Kelly Butler, USAID Acting Director, to
Donald J. Planty, United States Ambassador to Guatemala (Oct. 29, 1998) (on file
with the author) (explaining that these forms have been developed for the most
common legal proceedings in the courts and allow for information to be exchanged
among institutions in an efficient manner).
138. See Ambassador Planty Cable, supra note 62 (noting that the judges in
these locations are preparing a formal request recommending that these forms be
put in use on a national level).
139. See DPK Final Report, supra note 16, at 12 (stating that these forms have
contributed to the increasing uniformity of practice throughout the country).
140. See Justice Executive Summary, supra note 9, at 39 (arguing that the administers of justice in Guatemala need to recognize the multi-ethnic and multicultural characteristics of the population and respond accordingly).
141. See Justice Sector Interpreters, Steven E. Hendrix (CREA/USAID, Guatemala, C.A.), Dec. 18, 1997 (on file with the author).
142. See Raquel Z. Yrigoyen Fajardo, Justicia y Multilingfie: Pautas para alcanzar una Justicia Multilingiie en Guatemala [Justice and Multilingualism: Guidelines to Realize a Multilingual Justice in Guatemala] 4 (Sept. 1999) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author) (citing the 1994 national census, which revealed that forty-three percent of the population was indigenous). Non-official
sources put the figure closer to sixty-one percent, making Guatemala the most indigenous country in the world. See id.; see also Roger Plant, Los derechos
indigenas y el multiculturalismo latinoamericano: lecciones del proceso de paz de
Guatemala [Indigenous Rights and Latin American Multiculturalism: Lessons from
the Peace Process in Guatemala], in DIALOGO 10 (No. 9, Oct. 1999) (stating that

the United Nations figures estimate the number of indigenous between sixty and
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providing translation services. This is especially important for
women and children who are much more likely to be monolingual in
a language other than Spanish. The Peace Accords are clear in the
mandate to provide translation services."'
Beyond Spanish, the country has at least twenty-three Mayan ethnic groups, speaking twenty-four languages derived from Maya,
Garifuna, and Xinca.'" However, K'ich, Kaqchikel, and Main are
the three predominant languages.' 45 Consequently, language differences greatly complicate attempts to advance access to justice, especially for indigenous groups, the poor, women, and children. 146
The legal translator services formed a natural complement to the
Justice Centers ' 17 goal of providing increased access to the justice
system. 148 With the signing of the Peace Accords in late 1996,
USAID'4 9 and MINUGUA (with USAID and Dutch funding)" ° took
immediate, emergency short-term measures to obtain translators out
in the field. In 1996, MINUGUA and USAID trained forty-five

sixty-five percent).
143. See Justice Sector Interpreters, supra note 141 (summarizing that the Peace
Accords sought to ensure basic human rights and constitutional due process by
providing translation services).
144. See Fajardo, supra note 142, at 6 (noting that the Academy of Mayan Languages estimates the official figure at 21 languages); see also Plant, supra note
142, at 11 (stating that one of the demographic characteristics of Guatemala is the
diversity of its indigenous population).
145. See Fajardo, supra note 142, at 7 (providing that these three languages account for sixty-five percent of the total types of indigenous languages spoken in
Guatemala).
146. See Justice Sector Interpreters, supra note 141 (noting that the poor,
women, and children are much more likely to speak only one language other than
Spanish).
147. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, supra note 11.
148. See Justice Sector Interpreters, supra note 141 (explaining that the USAID
activity seeks to guarantee the right to use translation services in the administration
of justice).
149. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, supra note 11.
150. See Memorandum from William Stacy Rhodes, USAID Mission Director,
to Donald J. Planty, United States Ambassador to Guatemala (May 27, 1998) (on
file with the author) (stating that USAID contributed $374,820 to MINUGUA's
multiculturalism and justice program, which provides training for legal interpreters
for non-Spanish speakers).
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translators for the Main and K'ich6 languages. In 1997, USAID
trained another thirty-four in Tecpdn in Kaqchikel.'" In 1998,
USAI) graduated twenty-five additional legal translators in the Pocomdm language, near Escuintla and Jalapa.'2 In addition, in 1997
and 1998, MINUGUA trained interpreters in Huehuetenango and
Cobdn in the Mam and K'ich6 languages."'
USAID maintained a bilateral translator program, which further
contributed to MINUGUA's multi-linguistic effort. As part of
USAID's bilateral program, USAID provided technical and logistic
support to MINUGUA's administration of justice and multilinguistic project in the justice departments of Quetzaltenango, TotonicapSn, and San Marcos. Specifically, the USAID bilateral program collaborated in the design and implementation of the curricular
training program, the selection of candidates for interpreters, technical assistance for the implementation and development of the training courses, and design of training materials and workshops on justice and multi-linguistic issues.""

151. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, supra note 11.
152. See id.
153. See Memorandum from Steven E. Hendrix, USAID Justice Program Coordinator to Neil Levine, USAID Justice Consultant (Oct. 5, 1998) (on file with the
author) [hereinafter 10/5/98 Hendrix Mem.] (noting that the interpreters were
trained jointly between MINUGUA and the USAID justice program); see also
Letter from William Stacey Rhodes, USAID Director, to Jean Arnault, MINUGUA
Director (May 6, 1998) (on file with the author) (stating that the final installment
of this funding was awarded on May 6, 1998); Erick Campos, Suspenden plan
indigena [Indigenous Plan Suspended], Prensa Libre, Aug. 24, 1998, at 5 (informing USAID that MINUGUA unilaterally suspended the training in August 1998);
Letter from Jean Amault, MINUGUA Director, to Rigoberto Quem. Chay, Mayor
of Quetzaltenango (Aug. 24, 1998) (on file with the author) (explaining that the
suspension of activities was only temporary); 09/03/98 Carner Mem., supra note
135 (informing the Ambassador of the suspended activity and that an internal assessment was being conducted). But see Letter from Jean Amault, MINUGUA Director, to George Carrier, USAID Mission Director (Aug. 5. 1999) (on file with the
author) (re-affirming USAID that it was moving ahead with the training); Letter
from Steven E. Hendrix, USAID Justice Coordinator, to George Carner, USAID
Mission Director (Oct. 5, 1998) (on file with the author) (relating that, as of October 5, 1998, MINUGUA was still telling USAID that it had not cancelled the activity); Letter from George Carner, USAID Mission Director, to Jean Amault,
MINUGUA Director (Mar. 16, 1999) (on file with the author) (terminating the donation from USAID to MINUGUA in a mutually-signed letter of agreement).
154. See Justice Sector Interpreters, supra note 141 (explaining the program
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In terms of methodology, MINUGUA created three different levels or profiles of interpreters. The most arduous training was provided to "legal interpreters" (or "judicial interpreters") who accompany legal proceedings doing simultaneous translations. The Court
and Public Ministry have created a few permanent jobs for this particular interpreter, assuring a degree of sustainability. The second tier
is for "institutional interpreters." These interpreters have other jobs
within the various justice sector institutions, but are called upon as
needed. The third level of interpreter is the so-called "Community
Interpreter." ' This individual serves as a bridge between local
groups and the official government actors from the formal sector.5'
Specifically, the USAID activity sought to guarantee the right to
use Mayan languages and the right to use translation services in the
administration of justice, as stated in the Criminal Procedure Code,
trained judicial translators in Kaqchikel and designed a glossary of
judicial terms in Kaqchikel.'7 In 1997, USAID visited the seven
Kaqchikel-speaking departments to interview municipal authorities,
Mayan organizations, administration of justice operators, nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"), and others to organize the
oversight committee ("comit directivo"). The USAID generated an
interpreter/translator profile, designed the curriculum for the formation and methodological training of the translators, and created a selection system for the candidates who participated in the training,
after which there was a training of trainers. In addition, the USAID
provided logistic support as well as materials for the training events
and developed a companion-training program for long-distance and
personalized education. USAID communicated these project activities in forums, radio programs, and conferences. " '
For the implementation of the training part of the program,
USAID developed two types of strategies. The first strategy involved
the translation and judicial interpreter career for the administration of
objectives and training strategy of the USAID Justice Sector Interpreters Program).
155. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, supra note 11.
156. See QPR No. 8, supra note 25, at 3 (reporting that these interpreters consist

of persons within the indigenous community who can serve as liaisons between
their constituents and the justice sector).
157. See Justice Sector Interpreters, supra note 141.
158. See id.
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justice institutions while the second strategy sought a community
translator to meet the demands of Mayan communities and institutions. Mayan organizations, public schools, and individuals recruited
people to apply to this training program. Candidates for the court
translator position had to have oral and written fluency in the language, knowledge of the Mayan culture, experience in translations
from Spanish to the Kaqchikel language and vice versa, and university studies in law. Candidates for the position of community translator required only verbal knowledge of the language and notion of
written communication, knowledge of the Mayan culture, and a
third-grade education. For the post of institutional translator, candidates were required to have verbal language knowledge, some notion
of written communication, knowledge of the Mayan culture, a third
grade education, and employment in a justice sector institution.' '
In terms of process, thirty-five institutions participated in the
conitg directivo for the management of the USAID program. Justice
system operators of seven departments (Baja Verapaz, Chimaltenango, Escuintla, Guatemala, Sacatep~quez, Sololi, and Suchitep~quez) were provided with basic training and sensitized on
pluri-culturalism and multi-linguistic issues. Training curricula and
programs were validated and implemented for interpreters. In addition, USAID compiled a glossary on judicial terms in Kaqchikel,
taking into consideration prior work by the Universidad Rafael
Landivar ("URL").I Since 1997, URL has produced legal dictionaries or glossaries in various languages."'
The impact of this effort was twofold. First, people were made
aware of their right to a translator in the criminal process via information regarding citizen rights that was given to justice system operators, local authorities, municipalities, and Mayan organizations.
Second, judicial operators in the Kaqchikel region have more information about this issue and recognize the state obligation to provide
translation services. 62
In 1998, USAID provided a grant of $10 million to URL. That
159. See id.
160. See id. (describing the results of the Justice Sector Interpreters Program).
161. See Comments of Timothy Cornish, supra note !1.
162. See Justice Sector Interpreters, supra note 141.
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program, known locally as Edumaya, ' is, in part, designed to institutionalize the judicial interpreters program.'64 Justice sector interpreters were essential in assuring that the courts afford due process to
non-native Spanish speakers. Through USAID's justice sector efforts
and the USAID investment in the MINUGUA pluri-culturalism and
justice program, USAID has responded to the urgent need for due
process in Guatemala under the Peace Accords and the Criminal Procedure Code. USAID designed the URL grant, in part, to ensure the
long-term sustainability of that effort. In 1998, URL enrolled 123
students in formal legal translator programs.1
65

Complementing the Justice Centers was a great undertaking in instilling a Justice of the Peace in every municipality across Guatemala.' 66 In the beginning of 1988, 118 municipalities lacked a formal
justice sector presence.' 67 In April 1998, the Commission for
163. EDUMAYA is the United States Agency for International Development's
project to advance the educational needs of Guatemala's Mayan population. To
address the education gap that exists between Mayans and Ladinos, USAID has
helped establish a university fellowship program for Mayan leaders. Currently,
1,070 people are enrolled in Guatemalan universities in critical careers such as legal translators, bilingual education, nursing, and business administration. In a separate program, 120 of 340 Mayan bilingual teacher candidates have completed their
studies and have been certified based on USAID help. The USAID-funded Save
the Children literacy program similarly provides support to local private organizations in remote regions of Guatemala. At present, 18,5000 youth and adults are
participating in the USAID-supported literacy program.
164. See Fajardo, supra note 142, at 57 (explaining that, in an effort to encourage people to become legal translators, the program offered incentives, including
academic scholarships and money for room and board).
165. See 10/5/98 Hendrix Mem., supra note 153 (detailing the number of legal
translators enrolled in the program). The legal translator program had the following
composition: Central Campus (35 total students; Poqomam, 10; Kaqchikel, 22;
Tzutijil, 3); Coban (35 total students; Keqchi, 22; Pocomchi, 8; Achi, 5); and
Quetzaltenango (53 total students; K'ich6, 28; Main, 15; Quanjobal, 10). See id.
166. See Organismo Judicial-Comisi6n de Modernizaci6n, Secretaria de Planificaci6n y Desarrollo, Plan de Instalaci6n de Juzgados de Paz-Corto Plazo I [Judicial Body-Modernization Commission, Secretary of Planning and Development, Plan to Install Justices of the Peace-First Phase] (Mar. 1998) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author) (describing that the Plan has two phases). First,
the Plan calls for the creation of 60 Justices of the Peace to be stationed in every
municipality of the Republic. See id. The Second Phase consists of installing Justices of the Peace in the remaining 52 municipalities. See id.
167. See Ambassador Planty Cable, supra note 62 (detailing the overall condition of many municipalities that lacked a formal Justice of the Peace).
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Strengthening of Justice Reports suggested placing Justices of the

Peace in all locations.' 68 USAID aided the Judicial School in creating
and designing appropriate curriculum for the candidates.' Throughout 1998, USAID trained 120 candidates and filled sixty positions,

mainly in rural, indigenous areas.' 70 Furthermore, USAID assisted the
Court in its selection of appropriate candidates."' During 1999, the

remaining locations received Justices of the Peace,'" also trained by
USAID at the Judicial School. 17 While the United Nations Development Programme ("UNDP") collaborated in the effort by paying a

168. See 09/18/98 Carrier Mem., supra note 30 (discussing negotiations that
every municipality have a Justice of the Peace).
169. See id. (discussing USAID's attempt to train individuals for the many municipalities that lacked Justices of the Peace). The Centers include a component of
outreach to non-governmental organizations, the private bar, and the local community. See Quarterly Progress Report No. 7, DPK Consulting (CREA/USAID, Guatemala, C.A.), July 1, 1996 to Sept. 30, 1996, at 15-16 [hereinafter QPR No. 7]
(demonstrating CREAJUSAID's attempt to reach the public and inform them about
the criminal justice system). This has taken the form of local conference, radio
programs, and publications. See id. (stating that USAID aided in the printing of
pamphlets to help victims better utilize the criminal justice system). The Centers
also initiated a series of "seminarios permanentes" (lecture series) on legal topics
as a key part of bringing along the legal community in the changing notions of the
law. See Quarterly Progress Report No. 5, DPK Consulting (CREA/'USAID, Guatemala, C.A.), Jan. 1, 1996 to Mar. 30, 1996, at 6 [hereinafter QPR No. 5] (reporting on the importance of seminars in informing the public about their criminal justice system).
170. See id. (noting the progress USAID made in implementing its new programs); see also Ambassador Planty Cable, supra note 62 (emphasizing the efforts
put forth by USAID in order to ensure that all communities receive a Justice of the
Peace).
171. See 05/28/99 Butler Mem., supra note 68 (stating that USAID aided the
Court in selecting individuals to be candidates for Justices of the Peace).
172. See Memorandum de Carolina de Argueta sobre los Archivos de la Reuni6n de la Communidad Internacional del Sector Justicia en Guatemala con el
Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia [Memorandum from Carolina de Argueta on the Minutes of the Meeting Between the International Community of Jusflee and the President of the Supreme Court] (Mar. 9, 1999) (on file with the
author) (discussing the new Justices of the Peace and outlining the possible functions that these Justices will have within their respective locations).
173. See 09/18/98 Carrier Mem., supra note 30 (discussing that USAID is to
train its last group of candidates to be Justice of the Peace); see also 05/28/99
Butler Mem., supra note 68 (elaborating on USAID's role in training that last prospective Justice of the Peace).
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per diem to the candidates in classes, Spain paid them an honoraria.'

VII. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
PLEA BARGAINING: THE MEDIATION SUBCOMPONENT OF THE JUSTICE CENTER MODEL
The Justice Strengthening Commission calls for an increase in the
use of mediation as a means to advance access to justice. 71 USAID's
mediation effort enables citizens to obtain more equitable and accessible justice, while maintaining a sense of respect for local leadership
and customary law.' 76 This program emphasizes institutional mechanisms that citizens can use to resolve conflicts.' 77 Officials can utilize
these practices to incorporate aspects of local customary law into the
local administration ofjustice and the resolution of disputes., 7"
The Peace Accord on indigenous rights obligates the government
of Guatemala to cultivate legal mechanisms that recognize more applicable Mayan or customary law practiced within indigenous communities. ' 9 The Accord requires the recognition of traditional local
authorities, so long as the policies of these authorities do not contradict national or international human rights. 8 ' USAID programs fa174. See 05/28/99 Butler Mem., supra note 68 (noting that USAID and Spain
worked together in contributing to the success of the program).
175. See Ambassador Planty Cable, supra note 62 (asserting that the mediation
program enables citizens to have increased access to justice while de-congesting
the courts).
176. See Cable from Embassy of Guatemala to the United States Secretary of
State on USAID/Guatemala Activity Advancing Conflict Resolution (July 7, 1998)
(on file with the author) [hereinafter Conflict Resolution Cable] (discussing how
USAID has provided citizens with more ways to access justice while, at the same
time, recognizing the importance of local values).
177. See id. (relating how the new mediation program enhances the ability of
citizens to resolve disputes independently).
178. See id. (elaborating on the extensive nature of the mediation program, as
well as the success this program has had in allowing officials to bring justice to the
localities of Guatemala).
179. See id. (relating how the government considered customary legal practices
of the country in order to improve conditions for democratization).
180. See id. (noting that, in the wake of the Peace Accords, the law calls for increased cooperation between the justice system and the local rule of law, with deference to the practice of traditional local authorities).
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cilitate more understanding and recognition for the state legal system
and customary law by establishing better communication and fostering greater cooperation.' In addition, USAID activity strengthens
public institutions, such as the Guatemalan Supreme Court and Public Ministry, which participate in the programs attempting to reform
the administration of justice on a local level. "
Moreover, USAID is concerned with the recommendations of the
Justice Strengthening Commission."' The Commission recommends
that there must be greater access to services, the development and
recognition of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") methods, as
well as the development of legal mechanisms for greater recognition
of indigenous customary law.' '
The mediation program advances access to justice and decongests
the courts.' It provides decentralized justice at the community level,
providing more power to individuals and civic organizations in resolving their own disputes.' In addition, it alleviates congestion on a
larger scale at the community level for these officials, who handle
such disputes. 7 In addition, mediation augments traditional methods
of conflict resolution; people are able to save time and money and
are also able to access justice in their own community and lan-

181. See Conflict Resolution Cable, supra note 176 (asserting that USAID's efforts to strengthen administration of justice has improved relations with government officials and community leaders).
182. See id. (illustrating the role higher-level government officials played in implementing local programs nation-wide).
183. See id. (noting that some USAID efforts are a product of the Justice
Strengthening Commission's concerns with having better access to services and
recognition of local law).
184. See Strengthening Non-formal Channels of Administration of Justice,
USAID Justice Program (CREAIUSAID, Guatemala, C.A.), Aug. 30, 1999, at 1-2
(on file with the author) [hereinafter Strengthening Channels] (explaining attempts
by USAID to improve the criminal justice system through mediation programs).
185. See id. at 13 (emphasizing the extent that mediation programs ensure better
access to legal institutions).
186. See id. (noting that mediation programs diminish the centralized legal system and place more autonomy and responsibility at the local level).
187. See id. (discussing how mediation has improved the criminal justice system
at the local level by decreasing the caseload of auxiliary mayors).
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guage.188
In 1998 and 1999, USAID assisted in opening nine new mediation
centers. ' 9 While USAID assisted in opening two in Solol' and two
mediation centers in Zacapa, it also assisted in the implementation of
five in the Quetzaltenango Department.'90 The mediation model consists of two fundamental components: first, a set of conflict resolution techniques that take into account cultural and institutional considerations, and, second, an emphasis on cooperation between
justice-sector officials and local leaders in the utilization of these
techniques. 9'
The physical location or cultural setting does not seem to be determinative-the model is adaptable. ' 92 USAID supported new Mediation Centers in 1998 and 1999 in many cases such as a municipality building, a university, a moderately assimilated rural indigenous
area, a rural indigenous area using indigenous law practices, and a
rural mestizo area.' 93 USAID incorporated each of the nine Centers
into a pre-existing governmental institution or a local organization to
guarantee sustainability.'9 4 In the program, USAID trained 480 Guatemalan mediators, 153 of whom became active mediators in the nine

188. See id. (indicating that mediation centers increase the community's willingness to participate in the justice system by submitting disputes to local mediators).
189. See Strengthening Channels, supra note 184, at 2 (relating the number of
mediators involved in the various mediation centers implemented by USAID).
190. See Ambassador Planty Cable, supra note 62 (noting the number and location of new centers established in 1998).
191. See Strengthening Channels, supra note 184, at 2 (detailing characteristics
of conflict resolution programs and discussing the importance of cooperation between judicial officials and community leaders to ensure successful implementation of these techniques).
192. See id. (noting that, due to the adaptability and flexibility of these conflict
resolution groups, it is possible to utilize these programs in other parts of the
country).
193. See id. at 13 (providing several examples that illustrate the high adaptability of these mediation programs).
194. See id. at 2 (explaining how officials have attempted to make conflict
resolution programs comport with the communal as well as governmental structure).
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Mediation Centers. 95 During the first year, May 1998 to May 1999,
733 cases were mediated at the various Mediation Centers.'" While
the Mediation Centers resolved seventy-four percent of all cases, the
parties dropped or abandoned another eight percent and left only
fourteen percent unresolved. 197 These mediated cases included criminal, civil, family, and labor issues."" If participants choose, they may
have the local court validate the mediation to provide it with legal
backing.' 9
In each case, local leaders established and now maintain the centers.2 '0 In Quetzaltenango, the Mediation Centers served as an important mechanism for access to justice, in a manner that complements customary law and values. Every Center provides free access
to justice for the underprivileged, including, women, children, and
indigenous people.2 0' Local partners have made excellent strides in
teaching communities how to resolve conflicts peacefully through

195. See id. (discussing North American, Nicaraguan, and Guatemalan elforts to
train and work with several hundred mediators so that some could be used in the
new Mediation Centers).
196. See Strengthening Channels, supra note 184, at 2, 11.
197. See id. at 11 (putting forth numbers on the success of the Mediation Centers
noting that some of the cases were dropped due to one of the parties not appearing
to participate in the mediation process). There were no abandoned cases in Quetzaltenango-all came from Zacapa, indicating cultural differences in approach to
dispute settlement and, of course, skewing the data. See id. The Zacapa Center actually had much more difficulty settling the cases, with only forty-eight percent
resolved, which brought down the total average of the program. See id.
198. See id. at 11-12 (stating that, while some Mediation Centers dealt with
mostly penal cases, other had cases involving civil, family, or labor issues).
199. See Strengthening Channels, supra note 184, at app. (using statistics to indicate that individuals are able to register their agreements with the local court).
The Ladino communities are much more interested in having their settlements
"validated" or registered ("homologaci6n") by courts. See id. (presenting data on
the tendency of non-indigenous communities to seek court-approved backing of
their agreements). In cases of non-compliance, such registration is important to get
court enforcement of the mediation settlement. For indigenous groups, this seems
to be less important, as one's word or agreement is considered sacrosanct.
200. See Ambassador Planty Cable, supra note 62 (elaborating on the important
role that leaders in the community played in organizing the mediation programs).
201. See id. (emphasizing the way that the Mediation Centers improved upon the
previous legal institutions by enabling all citizens to have access to their criminal
justice systems).
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mediation.0 2 Partners educated citizens in the basics of the law so
that they know how to resolve some of the more pressing cases
through the judicial system.03 While local partners have already established two Mediation Centers in Zacapa, communities in Quetzaltenango are choosing first to pursue increased education through
workshops and other programs. 2°4 The partners plan to allow the
communities to decide if they want to establish a Mediation Center
or simply train community leaders and local officials in mediation
techniques.20 ' This geographic focus results in the development of
two potentially different methods of teaching dispute resolution
techniques.0 6 For example, while regions of Eastern Guatemala are
primarily non-indigenous and have minimal experience in mediation,
the population in Northwestern Guatemala is mostly indigenous and
possesses some experience
in conflict resolution due to its practice in
S 201
local, customary law.
Communities are using several tools essential to developing their
ability to utilize the mediation techniques."" While these efforts resulted in the establishment of two Mediation Centers in Zacapa, officials developed several others in Quetzaltenango in July 1998.2'0 Local leaders, judges, and prosecutors have attempted to increase
cooperation through joint training, discussion sessions, information

202. See Conflict Resolution Cable, supra note 176 (discussing the positive impact that local partners had on instructing citizens to utilize the criminal justice
system).
203. See id. (detailing efforts to teach locals how to better resolve some of their
disputes).
204. See id. (highlighting different regional approaches to establishing local
Mediation Centers).
205. See id. (elaborating on Quetzaltenango's approach of leaving it to the
community to decide how best to implement mediation programs).
206. See id. (stating that differences in approaches to conflict resolution lead to
overall geographic disparities based on the existing legal practices of these areas).
207. See Conflict Resolution Cable, supra note 176 (providing an example that
illustrates how two regions of the country differ in their mediation experience and
the composition of their populations).
208. See id. (asserting that local groups are attempting to apply their knowledge
and training in establishing better methods of conflict resolution).
209. See id. (noting the progress of the Mediation Centers as communities attempt to implement these programs).
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sharing, and other activities. Interestingly, while men tend to utilize
the service more often, women seem to benefit particularly!" Although women requested fifty-nine percent of mediations, men were
called to mediation in fifty-five percent of the cases.1 Further, while
the largest portion of cases, forty-two percent, involves a conflict
between men, another twenty-eight percent were conflicts brought by
women against men.13 Whether mediation works as a longer-term
solution may depend upon whether the parties honor the settlements.
In Zacapa, seventy-three percent of mediated settlements were fully
honored within just one month of the agreement, while another
twenty-two percent were at least partially honored!" In only five
percents of the cases the parties did not completely fulfill their agreement.
The World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank ("IDB"),
MINUGUA, Organization of American States ("OAS"), and UNDP
have collaborated with USAID to ensure that the new Guatemalan
vision for justice-sector reform survives!" These institutions have
developed numerous studies and related activities, particularly on
ADR issues.1 7 In addition, USAID is collaborating with the Guatemalan Supreme Court to implement its experience with community
ADR in certain regions of Guatemala. ' ' The Guatemalan Supreme
Court initiated a parallel program in August 1998 to create court210. See id. (emphasizing the steps taken by officials to work together to ensure
successful programs).
211. See Strengthening Channels, supra note 184, at 12 (reporting that women
would usually request mediation, even though, as a whole, more men were involved in these disputes).
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id. (noting the success of these mediations in terms of whether the
agreements were fulfilled).
215. See id. (discussing the success of mediation based on follow-up surveys inquiring as to the completion of mediation agreements).
216. See Conflict Resolution Cable, supra note 176 (relating how other international institutions have assisted the USAID in reforming Guatemala's criminal justice system).
217. See id.
218. See id. (discussing efforts by USAID and the Court to bring better conflict
resolution to Quezaltenango and Zacapa).
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annexed mediation and conciliation centers in urban areas throughout
Guatemala.2 9
Interestingly, Ladino 220 use of mediation appears to differ from
similar use by indigenous populations. The Ladino communities prefer to have their resolutions registered ("homologados") so that the
decisions will have judicial backing in case of non-compliance. 22 1 In
indigenous communities, where one's word is sacrosanct, the practice of registering a settlement with a court is much less common.'
Plea-bargaining procedures are drastically under-used even when
appropriate. Certainly, the justice system needs to resolve criminal
cases short of trial when appropriate. Receptivity to USAID training
in this area has been high when the counterparts have an opportunity
to examine and understand what is being proposed.2 ' The Judicial
School, with USAID support, organized seminars2 4to update judges
on developments involving plea-bargaining issues.

VIII. ISSUES OF MULTIPLE MODELS AND DONOR
COORDINATION
From the outset of the Justice Centers, USAID sought to assure
that the donors worked together, and not at counter-purposes. For ex-

219. See Ambassador Planty Cable, supra note 62 (recalling the President of the
Guatemalan Supreme Court's desire to extend the mediation program throughout
Guatemala after his visit to the Justice Center in Quezaltenango).
220. Ladino in this context refers to persons of non-indigenous origin.
221. See Strengthening Channels, supra note 184, at app. (providing data indicating that non-indigenous communities prefer to register their mediation agreements with the local court).
222. See id. (reporting that all of the Ladino population requests "homologaci6n'" or registration in the majority of the cases). In the Main areas, individuals
file for registration in less than half the cases. See Memorandum by Steven E.
Hendrix on Mediation-Differences in Practices Between the Ladino and Indigenous (Dec. 2, 1999) (on file with the author). In the K'ich areas, there are no cases
of request for registration. See id.
223. See QPR No. 3, supra note 117, at 7, 12-13 (noting that, to increase the use
of plea-bargaining, USAID brought an American lawyer to Guatemala to assist in
developing procedures and activities).
224. See id. (discussing that the seminars occurred at the Judicial School in 1998
and featured presentations by many distinguished representatives of the Guatemalan Supreme Court and Public Ministry, USAC, and USAID).
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ample, in 1995, USAID sought MINUGUA and UNDP to coordinate
activities jointly and maximize project impact. -"On
August 27,
1997, Ambassador Planty led a meeting with Guatemala's Interior
Minister Rodolfo Mendoza, Guatemala's Attorney General Ht~ctor
Hugo P6rez Aguilera, and Guatemalan Supreme Court Magistrates
Humberto Grazioso and Julio Ernesto Morales in Quetzaltenango.:"
During the meeting, the leaders of these three institutions-police,
prosecution, and court-promised their support for the Justice Center
model. 7 Adding to these events, in 1996 President Alvaro Arzil visited the Quetzaltenango Center.2
At the same time, the Interior Ministry pledged its support of the
Justice Center Model with the request that the Instancia Coordinadora accomplish designation of all future centers, an offer United
States Ambassador Planty accepted immediately. Planty thereby
agreed that USAID would support Escuintla, Minister Mendoza's
choice location. Since that time, the Instancia requested USAID to
enlarge and copy the Justice Center model in Escuintla, Nebaj, San
City.2"
Benito (Pet6n), and the criminal courts in Guatemala
USAID has received support for the Justice Center model from
other areas of the government. In 1997, the Guatemalan Supreme
Court and Public Ministry approved the USAID "Work Plan," which
applied the Justice Center model. On June 1, 1998, Guatemala's
Court President Figueroa and Attorney General Gonzlez Rodas organized an official signing ceremony for approval of the 1998 Work
Plan. On June 12, 1998, the Instancia approved all of the working

225. See Memorandum from William Stacy Rhodes, USAID Director, to
Marilyn McAfee, United States Ambassador to Guatemala (Nov. 7, 1995) (on file
with the author) (emphasizing the need to find new methods to combine forces and
collaborate).
226. See 09/18/98 Borns & Hendrix Mem., supra note 21.
227. See Ambassador Planty Cable, supra note 62 (summarizing the progress in
advancing justice-sector reform and solidifying cooperation within the community).
228. See DPK FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 9 (commenting that the work
accomplished by the Justice Centers attracted the attention of justice-sector officials throughout the country); see also QPR No. 7, supra note 169, at 17 (reveahng
that other visits by policymakers demonstrate their interest in the progress of the
activities in the Justice Centers).
229. See 09/18/98 Bors & Hendrix Mem., supra note 21.
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formats from the Justice Centers for national use. On July 17, 1998,
the Public Ministry requested that USAID provide training to all district attorneys ("fiscales distritales") on the Justice Center model.
The Guatemalan Supreme Court granted final approval to reorganizing the criminal courts in Guatemala City on July 29, 1998.""
USAID organized a series of meetings to support the Justice Center model and other activities. The first set of meetings involved
mixed groups of justice-sector actors and principal counterparts. 1
USAID met privately with the Guatemalan Public Ministry,3 2 the
Supreme Court,"' and Planning Secretariat ("SEGEPLAN"), again to
solidify plans for future activities and the application of the Justice
Center model.3 At the same time, USAID established a series of
meetings with the primary donors in the area, including
MINUGUA,235 the IDB, 3 the World Bank, 23 7 the UNDP, 38 the Euro230. See id.
231. See id. (revealing that the meetings included one with Instancia Coordinadora representatives on Dec. 4, 1997, and the Comiti de Enclace on Jan. 27,
1998). USAID also met with the Justice Strengthening Commission on Jan. 29,
1998. See id. In addition, USAID sought discussions with non-formal channels of
access to justice, including Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra (Judicial School Director), Nery Guzmdn (Planificaci6n,MP), Edgar Lemus (Area Penal, USAC), Cipriano Soto (Bufete Popular, USAC), Ernesto Burgos (Deputy Director, Public
Ministry Training Unit-UNICAP), Alfonso Novales (President, Colegio), Xiomara G6mez (Unidad Acad~mica, Colegio), Roberto Morales (Planificaci6n,
Court System), and others. See id.
232. See 09/18/98 Boms & Hendrix Mem., supra note 21 (remarking that
USAID's outreach effort included meetings with Guatemala's Attorney General,
H6ctor Hugo P6rez Aguilera, on Oct. 2, 1997, Gustavol Mendizabal on Dec. 12,
1997, and Maritza Palencia on Jan. 12, 1998).
233. See id. (noting that USAID's meeting with the Guatemalan Supreme Court
included talks with Astrid Lemus, Julio Csar Toledo, and Otto de Le6n of the Judicial Modernization Commission, and with Magistrate Julio Ernesto Morales
P6rez of the Guatemalan Supreme Court).
234. See id.
235. See id. (describing that meetings included discussions with Juan Farropa,
Luis Pasara, Victor Ferrigno, John Wiater, Raquel Irigoyen, Leila Lima, Carmen
Rosa Villa, Antonio Maldonado, John Wiater, Jesus Rodes, and Carmen Rosa
Villa).
236. See id. (citing a meeting with Sabrina Cojulin from ASIES, employed to
represent the IDB, to discuss the relationship between the IDB portfolio and
USAID). USAID also met with Roger Plant and briefed the entire IDB justicesector and dispute resolution teams, which were led by Fernando Carrillo. See id.
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pean Union, 2 9 the Economic Commission on Latin America and the

Caribbean ("CEPAL"),2*4 the Japan International Cooperation
Agency ("JICA"), 241 the Central American Bank for Economic Integration ("BCIE"), 242 Deutsche Gesellschaft ffir Technische Zusamienarbeit(the "German Technical Assistance Agency, " often referred to simply as "GTZ"), 243 the Cooperaci6n Espafiola,2'" and
others.245 In addition, USAID had talks with NAS, the International
Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program ("ICITAP")
of the United States Department of Justice, 2' and the United States
Embassy representative for human rights activities.
After the conclusion of this series of meetings, USAID organized
roundtable discussions to solidify proposed future activities and the

237. See 09/18/98 Boms & Hendrix Mem., supra note 21 (noting a meeting on
Jan. 9, 1998 with William Mayville).
238. See id. (remarking that USAID met with UNDP and MINUGUA to identify
the roles of donors, and that UNDP, Canadians, and others participated with
USAID to help define programs in the area of intra-familial violence).
239. See id. (noting that USAID met with Maria Fernandez on Sept. 30, 1997).
240. See id. (stating that USAID met with Margarita Flores on Sept. 8, 1997).
241. See id. (noting that USAID met with Amy Gray on Feb. 23, 1998).
242. See 09/18/98 Borns & Hendrix Mem., supra note 21 (reporting that this
meeting was with Marsha Field, Amina Tirana and William (Terry) Fisher of Harvard University, and Luis Salas of Florida International University).
243. See id. (relaying that Norbert Losing, Legal Advisor, and Lic. Jos6 Antonio
Monz6n from ASIES participated in this meeting with USAID).
244. See id. (stating that USAID met with Doloris Sanco Silvestre and Marta
Higueras of the Consejo General del Poder Judicial [General Counsel Office of
the Judiciary], Government of Spain, on Mar. 13, 1998).
245. See id. (referring to the donor coordination meeting on Oct. 17, 1997,
hosted by UNDP; that of Oct. 3, 1997, hosted by the World Bank; and the participation of all relevant donors in the Antigua meetings of Nov. 3-4, 1997).
246. See id. (observing that USAID met with the Embassy Law Enforcement
Committee, with participation by the DCM, Consular Section; Drug Enforcement
Agency; Economics Section; ICITAP; MILGRP; NAS; Political Section; Regional
Security Officer; USIS; and the Justice Department Immigration and Naturalization Service). USAID also prepared a briefing for General Charles E. Wilhelm,
Commander in Chief, Southern Command, which included human rights activities
of M1NUGUA and the Commission for Historical Clarification. See id.
247. See 09/18/98 Borns & Hendrix Mem., supra note 21 (noting that USAID
met with Shirley Stanton on Mar. 20, 1998).
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Justice Center model.24 1 On April 15, 1998, USAID traveled to
UPAVIM, 249 an all-female cooperative, to present the USAID strategy of reform. The following day, USAID met with representatives
of the Guatemalan Public Ministry, Supreme Court, Judicial School,
SEGEPLAN, Bar Association, Law School at USAC, and Interior
Ministry. 250 Within that month, USAID also met with indigenous
groups and leaders in Quetzaltenango. Finally, USAID organized a
meeting with all the major justice-sector donors to discuss Justice
Centers and future USAID activities." ' Among those attending were
the UNDP, Spain, MINUGUA, Holland, the World Bank, Sweden,
and the GTZ. The European Union and IDB were invited and confirmed, but did not attend. To obtain popular input on the Justice
Center model, USAID held additional meetings in 1998 in Zacapa
and Guatemala City.252
USAID's Peace Strategic Objective Agreement with the Guatemalan Government in 1997 committed USAID to support the Nebaj
Justice Center together with MINUGUA. Despite this, MINUGUA
proceeded with a new model without USAID. It opened a Justice
Administration Center ("Centro de Administraci6n de Justicia" or
"CAJ") in Nebaj in April 1997, with the purpose of extending justice
2 The
to a place that previously lacked a formal legal system."
MINUGUA CAJ model is distinct from the Justice Center model in
that it extends the present justice system in its current faulty state to a
new location, while the Justice Center model seeks to improve the
justice system.254 The CAJ model attempts to enhance access to jus248. See id.
249. See id. (providing that UPAVIM stands for "Unidas para Vivir Mejor"
[United for Better Living], a non-profit organization located in Mezquital, just outside of Guatemala City).
250. See id.
251. See id. (commenting that donor-coordination meetings were held throughout 1996-98 on the various activities of each donor). The United Nations normally
chaired the meetings, with USAID providing a representative to ensure that all the
donors were abreast of the USAID programs at all times. See id.
252. See 09/18/98 Borns & Hendrix Mem., supra note 21 (revealing that these
meetings were held on Apr. 27 and May 28, 1998).
253. See id.
254. See Pellecer, supra note 37, at 5 (discussing in further detail that the Justice
Center model plans to service areas such Esquintla, Quetzaltenango, and Zacapa).
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tice by focusing on indigenous people and their unique access problems, including linguistic barriers. The goal is to decentralize and
integrate justice sector services in an efficient, low-cost way. Alternative dispute resolution is also key to the success of the CAJ
model.25
Unfortunately, from the start, M[NUGUA limited USAID's role in
implementing the Justice Center model in Nebaj." First, it did not
invite USAID to participate."7 MINUGUA then attempted to limit
USAID to purely administrative issues, ' without input on determinative technical or legal issues.29 Even after MINUGUA management agreed to allow USAID involvement, it failed to inform its field
staff of this agreement and, consequently, the field staff refused to
collaborate with USAID. 60 As such, MINUGUA effectively ignored

255. See id. at 14-17 (delineating the goals of CAJ as increased access to judicial
services, implementation of an alternative dispute resolution, and increased access
to legal information through the establishment of archives).
256. See Memorandum from Tim Cornish, USAID Director, to Beth Hogan and
Sharon Van Pelt, USAID Democracy Officers (Jan. 3, 1997) (on file with the
author) [hereinafter 01/03/97 Cornish Mem.] (referring to USAID's proposal for
involvement as unacceptable by USAID members); see also Fax from Alejandro
Alvarez, MINUGUA Consultant, to Timothy Cornish, USAID Director 3 (Dec. 20,
1996) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 12/20/96 Alvarez Fax] (emphasizing
that USAID should have a limited role, though recognizing that it has implemented
a series of quality administrative modifications).
257. See 05/15/98 Rupprecht Mem., supra note 17 (discussing the frustrated efforts of USAID in an attempt to implement an administrative system at the Justice
Centers).
258. See 12/20/96 Alvarez Fax, supra note 256, at 3 (referring to CREA's administrative support); see also 01/03/97 Cornish Mem., supra note 256. See generally 08/19/99 Williams Mem., supra note 30, at 7-8 (indicating that MINUGUA
relegated USAID to support merely "procedural" areas in the Guatemalan court
system and Public Ministry, i.e., case-tracking, and administrative organization and
training). As a consequence, there has never been an executive committee to coordinate activities. See id.
259. See 12/20/96 Alvarez Fax, supra note 256 (providing copy of draft agreement between MINUGUA and USAID); see also Letter from Timothy Cornish,
USAID Director, to Alejandro Alvarez, MINUGUA Consultant (Jan. 3, 1997) (on
file with the author) (discussing the objectives and developmental steps to the Justice Center in which USAID was not involved); 01/03/97 Cornish Mem., supra
note 256 (discussing USAID's thwarted efforts dealing with technical and legal
issues).
260. See Letter from Walter Hernindez, USAID Consultant, to Steven E. Hen-
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the innovative administrative advances that USAID was able to design.16 ' MINUGUA provided no inter-institutional coordination,"'
other than the construction of two buildings. In addition, MINUGUA
excluded civil society from the development of the Nebaj Center.
Consequently, MINUGUA's planning
efforts continued throughout
2 63
involvement.
USAID
excluding
1999
In an effort to eliminate the multiple Justice Centers models and to
rescue the Nebaj Center, in February 1998, the Instancia Coordinadora requested USAID's assistance to introduce the USAID Justice Center advances.2 4 USAID Mission Director, William Stacy
Rhodes and Jesfis Rodes, the head of the Institutional Strengthening
Office for MINUGUA, signed a letter signaling USAID's intention
to support the Nebaj CAJ. Since April 1998, USAID has carried out
a number of programs in Nebaj and began to introduce the many innovations from the other "Justice Centers. 265 In July 1998, USAID
reiterated its desire to join all efforts and assure that any new Centers
take full advantage of the experiences gained in the USAID Justice
Centers. Consequently, the distinctions that might have existed at
one time between MINUGUA's work in Nebaj and USAID's efforts
drix, USAID Justice Coordinator (Sept. 2, 1998) (on file with the author) (contending that lack of communication existed between MINUGUA personnel and
that of USAID).
261. See 05/15/98 Rupprecht Mem., supra note 17 (discussing the problems in
the development of the Justice Centers).
262. See 08/19/99 Williams Mem., supra note 30, at 2, 8 (discussing the hampered USAID administrative efforts, e.g., the implementation of a modernized
case-tracking system).
263. See id. at 8-10 (noting that CREA has not sponsored any training events
since Aug. 1998, apart from the training on the case-processing system, which is
currently not operational).
264. See 09/18/98 Borns & Hendrix Mem., supra note 21 (contending that
USAID/CREA supported the Justice Centers with administrative and technical assistance); see also Pellecer, supra note 37, at 5-6 (remarking that MINUGUA and
CREA are working in conjunction to modernize the Justice Centers).
265. See 09/18/98 Borns & Hendrix Mem., supra note 21 (noting that in 1998, at
the request of the Guatemalan Public Ministry, USAIID held training sessions on
the Justice Center model). See generally Pellecer, supra note 37, at 5-6 (discussing
the administrative advances in Zacapa and Quezaltenango).
266. See 05/15/98 Rupprecht Mem., supra note 17, at 2 (reporting that the successful results of USAID seminars conducted on the criminal procedure code and
judicial training).
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elsewhere have dissipated.26 7
The Instancia Coordinadora expected USAID to be present in
future "Centers" at the close of 1998.26" In late March 1999,
MINUGUA informed USAID that it planned to open a new CAJ the
next month in Santa Eulalia, Huehuetenango. In April 1999, then
Executive Secretary of the Instancia Coordinadora, Magistrate
Astrid Lemus, asked USAID to participate in the Santa Eulalia CA,
providing technical assistance and operational planning in the new
Center.2 9 Later that month, MTNUGUA provided USAID with its
plan.7 This assessment recognized that the Nebaj experience had
"difficulties."2 7 USAID attempted to come to an agreement with
MINUGUA so that there would be only one model for a Justice
Center and to avoid the mistakes of Nebaj. :' Nevertheless, the
MIINUGUA Santa Eulalia plan ignored the technical and administrative advancements of USAID's Justice Centers and made

267. See 09/18/98 Borns & Hendrix Mem., supra note 21, at 3 (noting that this
result is because USAID introduced innovations at the Nebaj Center that differed
from many other Justice Centers).
268. See Pellecer, supra note 37, at 6 (remarking that the project will continue
for approximately three years so as to develop centers in all areas of the country).
269. See Memorandum from Letitia Kelly Butler, USAID Acting Director, to
Donald J. Planty, United States Ambassador to Guatemala (Apr. 16, 1999) (on file
with the author) (remarking that USAID will work in conjunction with other European donors); see also Letter from Jeff Borns, USAID Democracy Chief, to John
Wiater, M1NUGUA Technical Cooperation Advisor (Apr. 27, 1999) (on file with
the author) [hereinafter 04/27/99 Borns Letter] (discussing the request of USAID's
support in the participation of ADR systems).
270. See 04/27/99 Boms Letter, supra note 269 (explaining that MINUGUA's
Santa Eulalia plan arrived at USAID on Apr. 16, 1999). The plan discussed the
Nebaj experience, but failed to mention any USAID involvement. See id. (providing written comments to MINUGUA and repeating USAID's desire to collaborate
and participate).
271. See Email from Steven E. Hendrix, USAID Democracy Officer, to Jeff
Borns, Chief of Democratic Initiatives (Apr. 21, 1999) (on file with the author)
(identifying the Nebaj Center's major problems as an inoperative legal system in a
new location and the resistance to USAID support).
272. See Memorandum from George Carner, USAID Mission Director, to Donald J. Planty, United States Ambassador to Guatemala (May 7, 1999) (on file with
the author) (remarking that USAID plans to offer technical assistance with caution,
however, from the lessons learned from the development of the other Justice Centers).
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MINUGUA the key decision-maker.273
In October 1999, USAID provided the IDB with extensive input
for its design of a project for the justice sector, including information
about the USAID Justice Centers.27 4 USAID later hosted IDB officials on June 8, 1998 at the Zacapa Justice Center to provide the IDB
design consultants with an up-close examination of USAID's efforts
in the sector.275 When the IDB loan documentation was released, it
advanced a modified version of the CAJ. 1 6 Similarly, the World

Bank program fails to mention Justice Centers, although other figures like "Centros Regionales" (regional centers) and "Complejos
Judiciales77Departamentales" (complex judicial departments) are
proposed.

Many other organizations appear to be behind the USAID Justice
Center model. Nevertheless, there is still no uniform set of working
vocabulary to reference the Justice Centers. Guatemalan Supreme
Court President Angel Alfredo Figueroa, for example, used the term
"Centros de Enfoque" (Focus Centers), when referring to the USAID
efforts; "Centros de Administraci6n de Justicia" (Justice Administration Centers), when referring to some sort of new buildings and
possibly increased deployment of personnel; and "Palaciosde Justicia" (Justice Headquarters), when referring to a new physical infra-

273. See id.
274. See Letter from William Stacy Rhodes, USAID Director, to Waleska Pastor, IDB Representative (Oct. 8, 1997) (on file with the author) (noting a few of the
primary foci to be the resolution of civil, family, and commercial conflicts, as well
as the coordination between police and community).
275. See Memorandum from Letitia Kelly Butler, USAID Acting Director, to
Donald J. Planty, United States Ambassador to Guatemala (June 16, 1998) (discussing the various USAID efforts, i.e., uniformity of crime-reporting forms,
search warrants, and crime inspection and autopsy reporting).
276. See Inter-American Development Bank, Guatemala: Programade Apoyo a
la Reforma del Sector Justicia 8-18 (Apr. 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the author) (discussing the IDB-approach to the justice sector, with a modified CAJ, plus institutional development programs, and noting the MINUGUA
CAJ model and the USAID Justice Center approach).
277. See World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the
Amount of US $33 million to the Republic of Guatemala for a Judicial Reform
Project 6 (Sept. 28, 1998) (noting that additional ideas for models were discussed,
such as the "Cajito," a smallish version of the CAJ, and the "Cajote," which is an
expanded version for larger cities).
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structure for co-locating justice sector actors.:"
In extending the Justice Center model, USAID has followed the
leadership of the Instancia Coordinadora,which has the final say in
the selection of future sites. In the past, the Instancia Coordinadora
has used as criteria locations for new deployments of the new National Civilian Police, sites where communities themselves have requested the service, areas of particular inefficiency in the justice
sector, and other factors. USAID may attempt to optimize impact and
resources by creating new Justice Centers in areas where other
USAID efforts are on going. In this sense, USAID participates in the
selection process. In all likelihood, USAID would take into account
all the various factors-including budgetary, management, and absorptive capacity-when proposing the number, location, and timing
of new Justice Centers. Similarly, USAID would note other donor
activities, such as the IDB's offer
to finance infrastructure for eight
2'
"Justice Administration Centers."'
In the year 2000, each Justice Center will receive fundamental
courses in key areas, such as Criminal Theory, Criminal Investigation, Criminal Procedure-including constitutional guarantees, dispute resolution, and evidence-ADR, Legal Pluralism, Trial Advocacy, and Legal Writing. These courses will draw interest and
participation from individuals from Guatemala's courts, Public Ministry, Public Defense, private practitioners, and the Human Rights
Ombudsman's office. The official governmental training units attached to the courts, Public Ministry, and Public Defender Service
will offer each of these courses.

278. See 09/18/98 Boms & Hendrix Mem., supra note 21 (arguing that a uniform set of vocabulary between the Justice Center models will dissipate any confusion among officials).
279. See Request for Proposal No. 520-98-P-020, USAID Justice Program
(USAID/CREA, Guatemala, C.A.), Sept. 30, 1998, secs. C-D(llI) (noting that
USAID remained the only donor in the justice field until 1994; since then, the
UNDP, IDB, EU, and other organizations have joined in the endeavor).
280. See Mark Williams, Cursos de Capacitaci6n [Competency Courses]
(USAID/CREA, Guatemala, C.A.), Nov. 1999 (referring to prospective course
schedule).
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CONCLUSION
After the terrible history of genocide and human rights abuse in
Guatemala, it is clear the situation will not change overnight, as
Guatemala is still far from a tolerant society that respects human
rights. Regrettably, a sort of justice and rule of law existed for years
in Guatemala under which suspects were rounded up and shot. The
system was efficient and gave the illusion of security. There was no
need to invest in the institutional development of courts, prosecutors,
public defenders, or even civil society-the military could do it all.
In a modern world, one of global markets and values, this is obviously an unwanted characteristic. Guatemala is now faced with
building new justice institutions from the ground up. Even worse,
given that Guatemalans never had a tradition of rule of law, they
have no experience to draw from in creating positive institutions.
Justice reform in Guatemala will take several generations and will
involve a gradual learning process requiring a strategy of incremental
progress. Justice Centers are an essential part of this process.
The inescapable conclusion of the Justice Center experience is that
the Guatemalans themselves thought of an ingenious plan and implemented a reform system that responds to their needs and solves
their problems. Notwithstanding, however, combined foreign technical assistance and Guatemalan leadership were instrumental to the
process of bringing about fundamental changes in both the justice
system and essential Justice Center locations.
The Justice Center model is catching on and demand grows. The
Instancia Coordinadoranow seeks to expand the model to each of
the country's departmental capitals to provide national coverage."'
As a result of this Guatemalan-led initiative in Justice Center locations, women, the poor, children, and indigenous people have greater
access to an improved, more transparent, and more efficient justice
system. There is a reduction in corruption opportunities and impunity. Service to the community has increased and faith in the system
is growing. For these reasons, procedural due process has improved,
with corresponding improvements for human rights issues. As the

281. See Letter from Astrid Lemus, Executive Secretary, to Brian Treacy,
USAID Justice Chief of Party (Nov. 25, 1999) (on file with the author) (discussing
the continued development of the Justice Centers well into the next year).
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Justice Centers continue the trend toward decentralization, we can
expect these positive changes to continue. The challenge will be to
maintain this course of reform, with continuous adaptations and adjustments, to assure the rule of law becomes the norm for all Guatemalans.

